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Excuse me for prying, but I just have to ask you, are you Jewish or Arab?  
I'm an Arab Jew.  
You're funny.  
No, I'm quite serious.  
Arab Jew? I've never heard of that.  
It's simple: Just the way you say you're an American Jew. Here, try to say "European Jews."  
European Jews.  
Now, say "Arab Jews."  
You can't compare, European Jews is something else.  
How come?  
Because "Jew" just doesn't go with "Arab," it just doesn't go. It doesn't even sound right.  
Depends on your ear.  
Look, I've got nothing against Arabs. I even have friends who are Arabs, but how can you say 
"Arab Jew" when all the Arabs want is to destroy the Jews?  
And how can you say "European Jew" when the Europeans have already destroyed the Jews? 
 
 
It was only when I left that I remembered  
I hadn't wanted to get so involved,  
I really only wanted to tell her  
that my first babysitter in Morocco was a Muslim girl  
and that I have a black-and-white photo of her in an old album  
sitting on the mosaic tiles in the courtyard  
and that when I was a new Moroccan stiletto immigrant  
I tried in vain to recall a little boy's conversation  
with his babysitter in Moroccan Arabic.  
And whenever we brought her up, my mother would say:  





- An excerpt from the poem ‘Who is a Jew and what kind of Jew?’ 
by Sami Shalom Chetrit (1996) 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Introduction 
While the bulk of anti-Zionist literature has tended to focus on the disastrous effects 
of the creation of the state of Israel upon the indigenous Palestinian population and its 
consequences, including the present day endemic discrimination faced by Palestinian 
citizens of Israel (Lustick 1980), there is relatively little recognition of the tragedies 
that befell Jews from Arab countries (and also from Turkey, Iran, India & Ethiopia) 
during and after the creation of Israel in 1948. It is rarely acknowledged that Jews 
from the Arab world have been politically, economically and socially marginalized by 
the ruling Ashkenazi
1 elite and have suffered discrimination based on their appearance 
and cultural affinity – a phenomenon that is an inseparable part of the Zionist 
discrimination against Palestinians and Arabs as a whole (Giladi 1990:208). Professor 
Yehouda Shenhav (1996) has remarked that the new historians – those Israeli 
historians who have exposed the Zionist myths surrounding the creation of the state of 
Israel as ‘a land without people, for a people without land’ and revealed the 
massacres, expulsions and ill-treatment of Palestinians that occurred during the 
creation of Israel – have excluded from their revision of Israeli history the many 
injustices inflicted on Jews who came from the Arab world. The lack of recognition of 
the plight (and even existence) of Arab Jews is reflected in descriptions of the conflict 
in the Middle East as ‘a conflict between Jews and Arabs’ despite the fact that about 
fifty percent of Israel’s Jewish population are also Arab (Kanaaneh 2002:43).  
Israel, defined as the “Jewish State” but whose founding members were all 
European asserted from the outset the European character the Jewish state would take: 
Theodore Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, wrote that the Jewish state would 
serve as “the portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilisation 
as opposed to oriental barbarism”.
2 Conceptions of East versus West, of the modern 
and civilized world against the backward and barbaric “other” are a recurrent theme in 
Zionist literature and which are directly associated with the colonial Europe Zionism 
emerged from. During the first Zionist Congress, European Zionists consistently 
addressed themselves only to Ashkenazi Jews, rejecting the non-Ashkenazim and 
opposing the “tainting” of the settlements in Palestine with an admission of 
                                                           
1 Jews of European origin. 
2 Herzl T ‘The Jewish State’ cited in Giladi (1990:208).   2
“Levantine Jews” (Shohat 1999:9). Zionism’s answer to the “Jewish question” was 
therefore an analysis of the “European Jewish question” deliberately not concerning 
itself with the Jews from the Middle East, Asia and Africa (Massad 1996:54). It can 
thus be seen that Zionism is actually an Ashkenazi nationalist movement, a movement 
established by and for Jews of European origin (Giladi 1990:67).  
The repercussions of this movement though have had far-reaching effects not 
only upon the identity of Palestinians but also on Jews from all over the world 
(Massad 1996:54). Within Israel, and beyond, conceptions of “Jewishness” were 
subsumed by Zionism’s growing hegemonic status and “Jewishness” made 
synonymous with Zionism itself and therefore with European Jewish history and 
culture (Yuval Davis 1991:85; Shohat 1999:8). Through the Zionists’ lens the 
European Jews were seen as modern and scientific, the bearers of civilisation. The 
Arabs, on the other hand, were seen as backward, superstitious and primitive (such 
ideas reflected the prevailing European colonialist attitudes of the time which Zionist 
settlers had been imbued with) and classified as the common historic Jewish enemy 
(Kananneh 2002:4). Thus “Jew” and “Arab” have been constructed as two separate 
and antagonistic categories. The existence of Arab Jews therefore confuses these 
essentialist definitions of identity and challenges the homogeneity of such categories, 
which like most conceptions of race or nation are just that – concepts, constructions, 
which in reality are never that simple (Shohat 1999:10). Shiko Behar an activist and 
academic in Israel writes (1997:3) that  
prior to the eventual antagonist consolidation of Arab and Jewish nationalisms – 
we, Arab-Jews, were Arabs and we, Arab-Jews, were Jews. There would have 
been no need to state these tautologies was it not the case that many Israelis and 
Arabs still appear surprised to hear the term “Arab Jews”, or to historically dis-
cover our very possibility and existence…It seems our 2,500 years of continuing 
history in the entire Middle East should have been sufficient to clarify that no mys-
tery is inherent in our allegedly oxymoronic Arab-Jewish entity. However, given 
the Zionist and Arab nationalist historiographic and academic brutality toward our 
history, it is clear why this phenomenon is not so coincidental. 
Thus within the vast expanse of academic study on Israel and the conflict in 
the Middle East, exists a lacuna of academic research on the histories and experiences 
of Arab Jews, which as this paper will endeavour to show, offers an indispensable   3
perspective on the post-colonial creation of nations and identities in general, and on 
the conflict in the Middle East in particular.
3 
1.2  The Politics of Terminology 
The “Oriental” identity that was imposed by the Ashkenazi establishment on Jews 
who came from the Arab world has been internalised and twisted around by Arab 
Jews themselves and used to lay claim not only to their heritage but also to their 
situation as a people facing widespread prejudice (Massad 1996:54). Ella Shohat 
(1999:13) argues that the delegitimization of Middle Eastern culture has boomeranged 
in the face of, what she terms as, ‘Euro-Israel’, as this new collective identity born out 
of resistance and solidarity against racial discrimination and oppression, uniting Jews 
from Yemen to Morocco emerged. The term “Mizrahim” (literally “Easterners” or 
“Orientals”) came to be used in the 1980s by leftist non-Ashkenazi activists and it 
gradually began to replace the term “Sephardim”, which literally refers to Jews of 
Spanish origin (Shohat 1999:13). The term “Mizrahim” is inclusive of all non-
Ashkenazi Jews and signifies more than just place of origin as it evokes the specific 
experience of non-Ashkenazim in Israel (ibid.). The creation of a new collective 
identity served to recognise a shared experience and recent history comprised of high 
levels of poverty; of state ambivalence and discrimination; of over representation in 
Israel’s low paid jobs, isolated “development” towns, slum areas and prisons; of under 
representation in Israel’s universities and political institutions; but also of the 
resistance movements and struggles for equality and social justice (Aidi 2002; Giladi 
1990; Shohat 1999; Swirski 2001). Although the terms “Mizrahi”, “Sephardi” and 
“Arab Jew” are often used interchangeably, “Sephardi” is seen as an inaccurate term 
                                                           
3 This is not to suggest that there is no research or academic writing by Arab Jews, or other anti-Zionist 
writers, on the histories and experiences of Arab Jews but that relative to the research on the Palestinian 
population and on the conflict (the focus of which is usually on Israelis and/or Jews as a whole, and the 
Palestinians, and/or the Arab Muslim world), it is far smaller in quantity. In addition the work that has 
been completed often lacks the same level of recognition that research on other Israeli/Palestinian 
topics receive and there are a number of reasons for this: Firstly non-Ashkenazim are excluded from 
the academic world in Israel, particularly in anthropology and other social sciences, thus a large 
amount of research about Jews from Asia & Africa in Israel has typically been conducted by the 
Ashkenazi elite and is heavily rooted in Modernization theory and Orientalism (Lavie 2003; Dahan 
Kalev 2001). Secondly those academics who do write about discrimination, the political economy, 
Zionism and the conflict are marginalised by the Israeli academic mainstream and as the bulk of their 
work is written in Hebrew and relatively little is translated (due to the lack of financial resources) it 
therefore rarely makes its way outside of Israel to a wider audience. Works by academics such as Ella 
Shohat and Sami Shalom Chetrit amongst others, are more well-known and this is because they are or 
have been based outside of Israel.    4
referring only to Jews of Spanish origins and has been perceived as privileging links 
to Europe while disregarding Jewish roots in Africa and Asia (Shohat 1999:13). 
Especially since Jews have been living in Ethiopia and in the region of what is 
modern day Iraq, Yemen and Iran before the establishment of the Jewish community 
in Spain (Allouche 2003:13). This paper will therefore use the term “Mizrahi” and 
will only use the term “Sephardi” when referencing another author who has done so. 
While it is recognised that the term “Mizrahim” covers all Jews of non-European 
origin including Jews of non-Arab origin, it will still be used with the term “Arab 
Jews”. There are a number of reasons for this: firstly the overwhelming majority of 
Mizrahi Jews are Arab Jews (Goldscheider 1996:30); secondly the term “Mizrahim” 
reflects the common historical discrimination faced by all Jews of non-European 
origin in Israel; and thirdly the term “Mizrahim” is directly linked with the uprisings 
and resistance movements that took place in Israel in the seventies led by the largely 
North African (Arab Jewish) community.  
Even the term “Arab Jew” is a heavily politicised one but then all collective 
identities are inherently political (Shiran 1991:303). For Jews in Israel to define 
yourself as part of an ethnic group is still quite radical and few Mizrahim will actually 
define themselves as such, or as “Arab Jews”, or indeed “Jewish Arabs”.
4 When these 
terms are used by Mizrahim it is deliberate and signifies a political consciousness that 
recognises the historical roots of the contemporary Mizrahi situation – the forced, 
deliberate severance of their Jewish identity from their Arab identity, the efforts to 
erase their Arab past and the monopolisation of power and resources by the 
Ashkenazim (indeed the term “Ashkenazi” has come to signify the hegemonic white 
elite in the Israeli context (Shohat 2001)). Thus to define oneself as an “Arab Jew” 
represents resistance against the forces of erasure, denial and self hate. The heavy 
politicisation of these terms reflects the politicisation of identity in Israel generally, 
indeed the primary criterion of belonging to the state of Israel is founded in identity 
not citizenship (Rouhana 1998:281), which accentuates the ambivalent position of the 
Arab Jewish identity in Israel, and why for some, this term is still considered a 
misnomer. 
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1.3 The  Research 
By 1980 the fertility rate of Mizrahi Jews had decreased by fifty percent from fertility 
levels in 1950 (the beginning of the period of immigration of large numbers of Jews 
from the Arab world to Israel), a time period of just thirty years (Goldscheider 
1996:205). This fertility decline is typically explained as a result of increased 
exposure to “Israeli norms”, and that as immigrants from the Arab world were more 
‘exposed to Israeli culture and a modern economy’ the more easily they adopted 
‘modern, Western patterns of fertility’ (see Okun 1997; Goldcheider & Friedlander 
1986). These explanations reflect the Zionist narrative of “rescue” and 
“modernisation” of the Jews from the Arab world, which claim that the Mizrahim 
have been “saved” by Zionism from their “backward, oppressive” countries of origin, 
bringing them out of the “Dark Ages” and into the “Modern world” (Shohat 1998:5). 
In fact the higher fertility of non-European Jews was seen as evidence of their 
“primitive” and “uncivilised” cultures (Melamed 2005:35) and the transition to lower 
rates of fertility has therefore been presented as part of their “journey into modernity.” 
This “transition into modernity” is largely a euphemism for the eradication of their 
Arabic identity and assimilation into Euro-Israeli society (Shohat 1998:16). And this 
assimilation into Euro-Israeli society was, in turn, a euphemism for the channelling of 
Arab Jews into the low-wage end of the labour market. The objective of this research 
is therefore to demonstrate that these explanations, put forward by mainstream Israeli 
sociologists and demographers, do not reflect the complexities involved in 
reproductive decision making, nor the contextual ambivalence of Arab Jews in Israeli 
society.  
The approach of this paper to understanding changes in fertility trends of 
certain groups of the population follows the ‘political economy of fertility’ framework 
described by Greenhalgh (1990) (see Chapter two), which understands changes in 
fertility to reflect changes in the structure of opportunities, which is shaped and 
defined by historically developed conditions and processes. The questions this study 
concerns itself with therefore, relate to how opportunity structures facing non-
European Jews have been defined, controlled and shaped and by whom. It asks what 
role the assault on their Arab identity and the prevalence of modernisation and 
reproductive discourses, in policy and in the public arena, have played in 
constructions of the self and the family. This paper therefore explores the history of   6
Jews in the Arab world and the historical processes that led to their settlement in 
Israel; it also considers the historical processes behind the class and racial formations 
in Israeli society; and examines a range of demographic and welfare policies, 
concentrating particularly on the dynamics between poverty, ethnicity and class in 
Israel, and the power of modernisation and reproductive discourses on negotiations of 
identity. Because of the centrality of identity to political, social and economic 
entitlements in Israel, constructions of identity necessarily represent avenues for 
greater social mobility and access to resources. Thus this study also seeks to 
understand the nature of the dominant socioeconomic structures and discourses on the 
lives of Arab Jews in Israel and importantly the options through which social mobility 
and empowerment are perceived as possible.  
So far I have provided a brief introduction to the issues presented in this paper 
and attempted to justify their merit as important points of research and analysis. The 
following chapter sets out the analytical framework of this paper, referring to key 
theories and important academic works in the field of population and fertility study 
that have informed the framework through which the issues in this paper will be 
considered.  
CHAPTER TWO 
2.1  The Analytical Framework 
The study of reproduction, and more specifically of fertility patterns, can be 
approached from a number of different perspectives. The approach adopted is largely 
informed by the researcher’s political persuasion and world view: Proponents of 
Modernisation theory, or Structural-Functionalism, will tend to see the transition from 
high to low fertility as a defining part of the transition from “traditional” to “modern” 
societies and thus decreased fertility is seen as an important indicator of 
“development” and “progress”. This understanding, termed as “demographic 
transition theory”, has been particularly pervasive along with Modernisation theory, 
which both work to secure the central assumption that there exists a unilinear 
trajectory of modernisation and improvement on which the “Third World” is 
presumed to be moving along, and on which the pioneering Western world is on the 
frontier of, leading the way. Thus Modernisation and demographic transition theory 
thrive on simplistic binarisms of opposing twinned concepts: modernity / tradition,   7
development / underdevelopment, technology / backwardness,  civilised  /  primitive     
(Shohat 1998:3) that compartmentalize the world (and its people) into neat and 
convenient developmental hierarchies. Demographic transition theory typically 
explains fertility declines as following patterns of other “factors of modernization” 
such as literacy, female autonomy and education – viewing fertility transitions as 
stemming from a list of common factors that are relevant to all places and all times 
and that produce the same general outcome, and thus demographic transition theory 
presents too mechanical and narrow a picture of demographic transformations 
(Greenhalgh 1990:86-100). Indeed demographic transition theory lacks any 
appreciation of the social diversity within communities and their demographic 
regimes, but it ignores the class-specificity of fertility changes in particular. It thus 
survives on an inaccurate historical understanding of the processes that provoked 
demographic change, viewing those who have not entered the demographic transition 
as “behind” and “having to catch up”, as if the poor and the “Third World” had lived 
in another time zone apart from the global system of the late capitalist world (Shohat 
1998:11).  
The theory of demographic transition is thus evident in the analyses of key 
Israeli demographers and sociologists concerning the Mizrahi fertility decline and in 
order to demonstrate the inadequacies of these explanations, this paper will reveal the 
complexities of the historically developed conditions and processes behind the trends 
toward lower fertility – which is profoundly linked with social and economic class 
formations and constructions of identity. The analytical framework which I have used 
to demonstrate this is based on Greenhalgh’s (1990) ‘political economy of fertility’ 
approach. This approach goes beyond the conventional demographic transition theory 
to show that fertility transitions are products of changes in class-specific opportunity 
structures in response to transformations of global and regional political economies 
(Ibid:98). To direct the process of the research I have focused on the five key 
attributes Greenhalgh (1990:94) states may contribute to a political economy of 
fertility analysis: time, method, process, causality and level:  
The “time” aspect refers to the pre-requisite attention that must be given to the 
historical context, and Chapters three and five provide a thorough evaluation and 
description of events as they relate to the experiences of Arab Jews before and after 
the creation of Israel, in order to explore how patterns of access and use of resources 
developed and therefore how these historical processes have shaped contemporary   8
political, economic and social realities. This section of the paper is also crucial to 
understanding the processes that led to the rupture of the Arab Jewish identity and the 
profound consequences it has had for the Jews of Arab origin in Israel, and for the 
populations of the Middle East region as a whole.  
The “method” attribute refers to the use of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods in researching fertility declines. While this paper focuses on qualitative re-
search methods drawing on historical accounts and a range of secondary sources, 
quantitative measures have also been employed to demonstrate the extent of changes 
in fertility, population structure and the social and economic segregation of ethnic 
groups, which supports and strengthens the qualitative findings. This can be found in 
Chapter four, where the arguments concerning the Mizrahi fertility decline are fully 
elaborated. 
“Process” concerns the social, cultural, political and economic forces that 
underlie demographic change with particular emphasis placed on the political and 
economic and how these shape the social and cultural (Ibid:95). Thus I begin by 
focusing on the class and racial formations of Israeli society, this is alluded to in 
Chapter three, but Chapter five concentrates specifically on the processes of biased 
resource allocation, marginalisation, and the use of identity in creating and 
maintaining the class structures in Israeli society. This demonstrates how the structure 
of opportunities facing Mizrahim has been shaped and defined and what effect this 
structure has had on options for social mobility. Chapter six then explores the 
relationships between identity, class and reproductive status focusing particularly on 
the effects of modernisation discourse, and its Malthusian and Orientalist brethren, on 
conceptions of the family. Malthusian discourse is an important feature of the global 
politics of reproduction but is also visible within local contexts too, it is the defining 
narrative that explains poverty as a consequence of “irrational” reproductive habits, 
simply that people are poor because they have too many children (Hartmann 1987:6). 
Its portrayal as a “scientific” theory of population is intended to obscure its political 
agenda, namely to excuse dominant structural and institutional forces for their role in 
creating and sustaining poverty and inequalities, and indeed Malthusian theory has 
provided an enduring argument against social and economic change since it was first 
expressed by Thomas Malthus in his ‘Essay on the Priniciple of Population’ in 1798 
(Ross 1998:6). It thus follows that the echoes of Malthusian rationale can be heard in 
Modernisation theory and in Orientalist narratives, which both offer convenient   9
explanations for disparities in socioeconomic well-being, focusing on the “pre-
modern” or “primitive” status of the peoples concerned and not on the impact of the 
dominant political and economic forces that surround their lives. The prevalence of 
these discourses in the Israeli context is illustrated by reference to the minutes of 
Knesset meetings, statements made by members of the Zionist establishment, and to 
examples of demographic and social policies. In particular Chapter six focuses on 
how these discourses were utilised to reinforce the socioeconomic inequalities within 
Israeli society thus illustrating the political and economic agendas that are rooted in 
these discourses kept hidden beneath a developmentalist façade. 
The fourth attribute, “causality”, shows how these dominant macro-level 
structures and processes have actually defined people’s options and motivations, 
illustrating how people may be ‘constrained by both internalized cultural parameters 
and external material and social limits’.
5 I have attempted to demonstrate the effect of 
particular structural forces on opportunity structures and group identity throughout the 
paper, but this aspect of the analytical framework is particularly evident in Chapter 
seven that deals with constructions of identity and strategies for social mobility and 
empowerment. It focuses on the consequences of the division of the Arab Jewish 
identity and the efforts to eradicate the mainly Arabic heritage of Mizrahi Jews, 
reflecting on the strategies Mizrahim have employed to placate their ambivalent 
position in Israeli society. This aims to illustrate how the process of formulating 
options for greater social mobility and access to resources has been constrained by 
dominant paradigms. This chapter also draws on the work of Kanaaneh (2002) on the 
reproductive strategies of Palestinian women in Israel, highlighting the power of 
reproductive discourse and the practice of reproductive “othering” on negotiations of 
identity, in order to explore the role these discourses have played in shaping the trend 
toward lower fertility for both Palestinians and Mizrahim. The main weakness in this 
part of the analysis is the lack of personal testimony from individuals and couples 
regarding the most significant factors in their reproductive decision making. However 
the focus on works by both Mizrahi and Palestinian academics to illustrate the power 
of modernisation and Malthusian paradigms on conceptions of the Mizrahi and Arab 
                                                           
5 Ortner S 1989 ‘High Religion: A Cultural & Political History of Sherpa Buddhism’ cited in 
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identities, including reference to their own personal experiences and reflections, 
attempts to strengthen this part of the analysis.  
The final attribute, “level”, requires that the research be “multi-levelled”, 
which means making connections at the local context that is being researched with 
broader global processes (Greenhalgh 1990:94). In this paper there are references to 
the shared post-colonial experience of the peoples of the “Third World” and the 
prevalence of Modernisation and Malthusian theory as a tool to disempower and 
blame the poor and oppressed for their own misfortune (Hartmann 1987:3). Indeed the 
power of these discourses in the process of reproductive “othering” is a central theme 
in the research, and one which has important global parallels. This paper also focuses 
on the constructions of identities and nations in the post-colonial world, reflecting 
how strategies for emancipation have often been formulated according to the same 
narratives imposed on people by their oppressors (Shohat 1999:9). 
2.2 The  Methodology 
In carrying out the research I have relied upon a range of secondary sources to select 
data concerning the historical context of Jews in the Arab world and the processes that 
led to their displacement and settlement in Israel. I have used a number of secondary 
sources to explore the class and racial formations in Israeli society and the effect of 
reproductive discourses on these formations and on the negotiation of identities. 
These secondary sources include books, articles, newspaper reports and the minutes of 
parliamentary debates and government meetings. The main bulk of the demographic 
quantitative data was sourced from the works of key Israeli sociologists and 
demographers, in addition to the demographic data available on the Israeli Central 
Bureau of Statistics website.  
The qualitative data was supplemented by conversations with several Mizrahi 
academics and activists in Israel, and the information they provided is referenced 
throughout the paper. My observations and conversations during the research process 
in Israel have greatly informed the issues presented in this paper, however the main 
methodological limitation in this research is the lack of personal interviews regarding 
fertility preferences and reproductive strategies. The absence of these voices is due to 
many factors, not least the language barrier and restrictions on time which would have 
made successful interviews about sensitive topics highly unlikely. In addition, I was 
restricted to a limited amount of written sources on these issues as a significant   11
portion of the relevant materials are in Hebrew, which prevented me from accessing 
these rich sources of information. However I did manage to obtain a few translations 
of particular sections of these works.  
CHAPTER THREE 
3.1  The Jews of Dar al-Islam
6 
The world’s largest monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, all origi-
nated in the Middle East and thus Jews have a long and ancient history in the region. 
Even after the spread of Islam across the region, the Jews of the Middle East and 
North Africa formed an integral part of Arab history, society, culture and language. 
The Arabic language is in fact closely related to Hebrew and Aramaic and all Jewish 
philosophy written in the Islamic world was written in Arabic and it constitutes an 
inseparable part of Islamic philosophy, and indeed many other important Jewish texts 
in medicine and linguistics were also written in Arabic (Giladi 1990:12; Shohat 
1999:6). The famous Jewish philosopher and physician to Salah Edin, Maimonides 
(Arabic name Musa ibn Maymun), wrote his most famous philosophical work, ‘The 
Guide to the Perplexed’ in Arabic and he is considered a great example of peaceful 
coexistence and of the common Jewish Muslim past.
7 While it is important that the 
situation of Jews in the Muslim world not be idealized as there were episodes of per-
secution and conflict, there are many significant examples of coexistence that have 
been pushed into the margins of history. For example the Jews of the Middle East did 
not live in ghettos but in mixed communities where they spoke the same language, 
wore the same clothing and ate the same type of food as the rest of the Arabic com-
munity (Giladi 1990:69). Great Jewish spiritual centres were established across the 
Muslim world in Fez, Morocco, and in Aleppo, Syria, for instance (Allouche 
2003:14). In the eighteenth, nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries many 
Jews also occupied important positions in government, academy, literature and com-
merce in the Arab world. Thus it must be recognised that Jewish world history com-
prises a diversity of histories and experiences. 
However the historical account of the situation of Jews in the Muslim world 
varies greatly depending on who is recounting that history and this history has 
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specifically been distorted since the emergence of Zionism for evident political ends. 
Shohat (1999:6) writes  
When Zionist history does refer to what might be termed “Judeo-Islamic history,” 
the narrative usually consists of a morbidly selective “tracing the dots” from 
pogrom to pogrom as evidence of relentless hostility toward Jews in the Arab 
world, reminiscent of that encountered in Europe. 
Shohat (1999:6) argues that this notion of a common victimization of all Jews 
everywhere and at all times is a crucial underpinning of Israeli discourse and produces 
a Eurocentric reading of Jewish world history, which hijacks Arab Jews from their 
own geography and subsumes them into the history of the European-Ashkenazi shtetl. 
This reconstruction of Arab Jewish history serves not only to eradicate positive his-
torical links to the Arab world and to propagate the belief in an innate Arab hatred of 
Jews in order to further the Zionist nationalist project vis-à-vis the Palestinians; it also 
reinforces the Israeli Jewish identity as opposed to an Arab Jewish one, by emphasiz-
ing such hostility and tension between the two that the terms themselves become ideo-
logical polarities removing even the possibility of being both Arab and Jewish. 
3.2  The Jews of Palestine 
According to Giladi (1990:35) the local Jews of Palestine could hardly be 
distinguished from a local Muslim or a Christian - they wore Arabic clothing, spoke in 
Arabic and lived in mixed communities. The Ottoman authorities, ever mindful of 
European Christian penetration, attempted to strengthen both the Islamic and Jewish 
communities: The Palestinian Jews were given autonomy in religious, education and 
administrative affairs and to this end the Ottoman authorities allowed the Palestinian 
Jews to form a committee called “Knesset Yisrael” to run the affairs of the 
community and even granted them the right to mint coins for the use of the 
community.  
The indigenous Jews remained the majority of the Jewish population in 
Palestine until the beginning of the 20
th Century when Ashkenazi Zionist immigration 
began to increase (Giladi 1990:64). Many of the Ashkenazi immigrants kept 
themselves apart from the local Palestinian Jews and set up their own communities 
and schools, in spite of the availability of Jewish schools and community services 
already established by the native Jewish population.
8 Giladi (1990:39) states that these 
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acts indicated the isolationist mentality which prevailed from the beginning amongst 
Zionists, not only with regard to the Arab Muslim and Christian populations but also 
in relation to the indigenous Jews and even to the non-Zionist Ashkenazim.  
The separate Ashkenazi settlements required agricultural and construction 
workers and since many Ashkenazi Jews had been denied access to agricultural 
activities in Europe, local Arab workers had to be employed (Massad 1996:54) – 
usually the same peasants that had been driven off the land when it had been sold by 
absentee landowners to the incoming Ashkenazi settlers (Giladi 1990:39). However 
due to the self-described “socialist” Zionist principle of the use of “Hebrew labour”, 
which declares that Jewish labour must be used as opposed to the labour of 
“foreigners” (ie non-Jewish Palestinians), the use of Palestinian labour was seen to be 
corrupting this principle and so Jews from Yemen were encouraged to emigrate to 
Palestine (Giladi 1990:41 & Massad 1996:54). The party of Hapo`el Hatza`ir (which 
was renamed Mapai and later then became the Labour party) was the first Zionist 
organisation to have the Yemeni immigrants work on their settlements. In its 1908 
conference the party passed a resolution stating the necessity for Ashkenazi employers 
to employ the Jews from Islamic countries to do the work of the “foreigners” (Giladi 
1990:44). The Yemeni Jews were paid less than local Palestinian workers and 
suffered brutal discrimination as was demonstrated by the communiqué issued by the 
Yemeni Jews to the Ashkenazi community in 1913: ‘In your opinion we are 
insignificant and filthy dogs…We are despised by all for our poverty, but as God is 
our witness we only came from the Yemen on your advice’.
 9, 10 The Yemeni Jews 
were also forbidden from living inside the settlements and had to construct their own 
quarters outside (Giladi 1990:47). By 1918 there were 5000 Yemeni Jews in 
Palestine, which represented ten percent of the Jewish population.
11 This increase in 
the number of non-Ashkenazi Jews worried many in the Zionist movement as was 
expressed by Ahad Ha`am in 1912: ‘Yemenite immigration affects the nature of the 
Zionist settlement by dint of their different culture and mentality’.
12 The desire to keep 
Jewish  settlements   “European”   in  nature  whilst  using  cheap,  non-European  but 
                                                           
9 There are many accounts of beatings and attacks and of complaints about slave-like treatment. See 
Nini Y ‘Reflections on the Destruction of the Third Temple’ cited in Giladi (1990:46). 
10 Muharib A ‘The Yemenite Immigration and Hebrew Labour’ 1973 cited in Giladi (1990:47). 
11 Menahem N ‘Tension and Ethnic Discrimination in Israel’ 1983 cited in Giladi (1990:47). 
12 `Ahad Ha`am ‘Complete Works of  `Ahad Ha`am’ 1947 cited in Giladi (1990:47).   14
Jewish, labour laid the foundations of the future social and economic structures in 
Israel that are still acutely defined on religious and ethnic lines. In fact the Zionist 
anxiety concerning the “nature” of Jewish settlement remains deeply entrenched to 
this day and has fuelled great efforts to “ameliorate”, actually “Europeanize”, the 
make up of Israeli society. 
3.3  The British Mandate Period & Zionism 
When Palestine came under British control in 1918 they saw allies in the Jews of 
Western origin and not in the indigenous Jews whose leadership they saw as part of 
the enemy Ottoman system (Giladi 1990:50). The indigenous Jewish community were 
thus kept out of government and their influence weakened dramatically as their affairs 
were placed under the aegis of the Zionist Ashkenazi establishment (ibid.). The 
attitude of the Zionist leadership to Yemeni Jews was chauvinistic at worst, 
paternalistic at best, and the position taken toward the local Palestinian Jews was 
much the same – illustrated in this statement expressed by the revisionist Zionist, 
Vladimir Jabotinsky, in 1926:‘Jews, thank God, have nothing in common with the 
East. We must put an end to any trace of the Oriental spirit in the Jews of 
Palestine’.
13 This rejection of the East was, and continues to be, an integral part of the 
Zionist project which in fact denies the actual origins of most European Jews: The 
expressed affinity with Western European culture and the desire to mimic ‘Western 
style capitalist democracies’ (as expressed by Herzl) or, as Ben Gurion fantasized, to 
create ‘a Switzerland of the Middle East’ (Shohat 1999:7) replaced the culture of the 
rural poor shtetls of Eastern Europe with that of Berlin or Paris where relatively few 
Jews originated (Massad 1996:55).
14 It was this commitment to Western Europe that 
enabled the leaders of the Zionist project to ‘market its colonial endeavour as one of 
spreading European gentile culture with European Jews as its carriers’ and what 
must have made it so palatable to the European colonial powers at the time (Massad 
1996:55). 
It is of no surprise then that the British Mandate period saw the beginnings of 
the implementation of the Balfour Declaration which stated that a national homeland 
for the Jews should be created in Palestine. The British government was to be 
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14 Jabotinsky insisted ‘We are European and our musical taste is European, the taste of Rubinstein, 
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instrumental in facilitating the setting up of the Zionist governing apparatus termed 
the ‘State-to-be’. In 1948 this same apparatus became the state of Israel: the head of 
the Jewish Agency, David Ben-Gurion, became the Prime Minister of Israel, the 
Hagana (the secret army run by the Jewish Agency) became the Israeli Defence Force; 
the National Council became the Government of Israel and the Assembly of Deputies 
became the Knesset (Giladi 1990:51). There was not one non-Ashkenazi in any of the 
decision-making positions in these bodies (ibid.). It can therefore be seen that 
Ashkenazi Zionist domination of Jewish society in Palestine began in the British 
Mandate period and not in 1948.  
The scale of this dominance during the Mandate period was evidenced by the 
boycotting of municipal elections by the Sephardi Community Council in Jerusalem 
in 1938 as the candidates were heavily biased in favour of the Ashkenazim despite the 
majority status of non-Ashkenazi Jews in Jerusalem (Giladi 1990:52). The Zionist 
leadership in Palestine was also adamant that agricultural settlement should remain in 
the hands of Ashkenazi settlers – out of the eighty settlements established prior to 
1926, not one was for local Jews, only Har Tuv created in 1895 was for indigenous 
Jews and that was financed by Sephardic Jews in Bulgaria (Giladi 1990:54). The 
Zionist leadership insisted that local Jews be instead hired as agricultural labourers as 
part of the principle of “Hebrew labour”.
15 As the rate of Ashkenazi Zionist 
immigration grew, the indigenous Jews faced rising poverty as their housing, 
educational and health needs were increasingly ignored. Giladi (1990:53) comments 
that the discrimination against local Jews reached such an extent that their 
neighbourhoods became deplorable slums. However the local Jews were not the only 
non-European Jews to suffer such discrimination, particularly in the area of 
employment. Non-Ashkenazi Jews who had immigrated for religious reasons or who 
had been recruited to work in Palestine were assigned the menial and unskilled jobs 
by the Zionist establishment often despite their expertise or experience in particular 
trades and crafts: Giladi (1990:59) writes that during this period ‘“Salonikan” came 
to mean “porter” and “Kurd” came to mean “quarry-worker”. “Yemenite woman” 
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meant “servant” and “shvartse” (“black” in Yiddish) meant “Sephardi Jew” or 
“Arab”.’ 
Reference to this pre-1948 period illustrates how resources such as land were 
channelled toward the European population and denied to both the Palestinians and 
the Arab Jews. It shows how structures were built to only allow the Ashkenazim 
access to the means of production and to compel the Arab Jews into accepting their 
role as wage labourers. Understanding this enables us to see the obfuscatory nature of 
the “explanations” put forward by the Israeli state and mainstream Israeli academia 
for the growing social and economic disparities that currently exist between the 
Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in Israel – explained as the result of the lower educational 
achievements and social status of the Mizrahi Jews when they arrived in Israel, 
coming as they did from “backward, undeveloped countries” (see Semyonov & 
Lewin-Epstein 2004; Allouche 2003; Eisenstadt 1951). Reference to the pre-1948 
period demonstrates that these disparities have been created and developed as part of a 
deliberate discriminatory policy toward non-European Jews since the start of Zionist 
colonisation, before the majority of Mizrahi Jews immigrated and even before the 
creation of the Israeli state. 
3.4  Zionism & Arab Nationalism 
By 1950 around 800,000 Jews lived in the Arab world representing 5-6 percent of the 
Jewish world population (Allouche 2003:23). In the years following 1950 the 
overwhelming majority of Jews left the Arab world mainly for Israel, the United 
States and countries in Europe, leaving only a remainder of the Jewish community in 
Arabic countries. While the reasons for the emigration of the Jews of Dar al-Islam are 
various especially given the range of geographic localities Arab Jews inhabited, the 
two general principal causes that shall be focused on here are the rise of Arab 
nationalism, and the efforts of Zionists to recruit Jews from the Arab world. In the 
attempt to understand this pivotal chapter of recent history that has played such a 
profoundly substantial role in shaping the current geopolitical face of the Middle East, 
certain issues must first be addressed: 
It is important to remember that while the Zionist project was gathering steam 
in British controlled Palestine most of the Arab countries were also under colonial 
rule, which was largely either British or French. As part of the archetypal colonial 
divide and rule policy, colonial authorities in the Muslim world emphasised religious   17
divisions by granting privileges to the minority non-Muslim population in particular 
favouring members of the Christian or Jewish communities in government and 
business, and supporting Christian and Jewish education establishments (Giladi 
1990:79&80). Thus sectarian divisions were already being carved out, upsetting the 
inter-communal balance that had evolved in the region for over hundreds, if not 
thousands of years. These sectarian divisions were later to become desperate and 
violent as the situations created by colonial rule were exacerbated by Zionist activities 
and the reactionary stance taken by many Arab nationalist leaders. These issues are 
important facets of this discussion as it illustrates how these events (and the 
subsequent division of the Arab Jewish identity) were the product of a culmination of 
forces and not the result of some innate Arab/Muslim animosity toward Jews, as put 
forward by Zionist historians.  
After World War One colonial authorities, the British in particular, began to 
facilitate Zionist activity in their Arab colonies. In fact Cohen
16 writes that the British 
presence in Iraq was the most important factor for Zionist activity there as in 1921 the 
British allowed the Mesopotamian Zionist Organisation to operate inside the country. 
Needless to say few Jews from the Islamic world emigrated at this time, many were 
avidly opposed to Zionism which they saw as an extension of European imperialism. 
Indeed many Jews were involved in anti-colonialist activities, communist and other 
leftist organisations, and many were radical intellectuals.
17 One of the Jewish leaders 
in Baghdad wrote a letter to the WZO warning of the havoc Zionism would wreak for 
the Jews of Iraq, and that Zionism could alienate Jews from Iraqis and damage inter-
communal relations.
18 He wrote that every Arab felt Zionism infringed upon their 
rights and that it was thus incumbent upon him to spare no effort to fight it. He said 
that Iraqi Jewry was in a particularly sensitive position given its economic power and 
government posts, particularly in Baghdad, where Jews formed one third of the 
population. But in spite of the fact that many Jews were involved in Arab liberation 
movements growing sectarian anti-Jewish sentiments were beginning to resonate in 
the region.  
                                                           
16 Cohen H Y ‘Zionist Activity in Iraq’ (in Hebrew) 1969 cited in Giladi (1990:72). 
17 See Giladi 1990 chapter four. 
18 Rejwan N ‘The Jews of Iraq’ 1985 cited in Giladi (1990:72).   18
As anti-colonialist struggles began to strengthen in the Arab world, as they 
were doing across the globe, the emergence of Zionism in the region and its affiliation 
with colonial Britain, would have a massive impact on Arab liberation movements. 
Shohat (1999:9) states that  
At the height of imperialism, liberation from racial and colonial oppression could 
be formulated only along nationalist lines. In order to merit the end of colonial 
rule, third world nations had to be invented according to definitions supplied by 
the often Eurocentric ideologies of the nation as a coherent unit….On a realpolitik 
level, this was a “reasonable” response to colonialism. Unfortunately, however, 
formerly colonized people have often fallen into the very same conceptual traps 
that oppressed them during colonialism. 
This was a great downfall of the Arab nationalist movements, as before the 
arrival of European powers in the region and the creation of borders and new nations, 
identities were defined very differently. However within imported European 
paradigms Arab liberation movements began to define themselves along religious 
lines and thus religious minorities were pushed out into the margins. This then had the 
unintended consequence of reaffirming the Zionist goal, of separating Jews from non-
Jews, and in fact adopted the same Zionist rationale, that of producing religiously 
“pure” entities so as to allow the nation to emerge in all its “native glory” (Shohat 
1999:11). Thus although the Arab nationalist movement defined itself as staunchly 
anti-Zionist, Zionism played an important part in shaping Arab nationalism: Behar 
(1997:6) writes that the presence of Zionism  
largely contributed to the formation of a Middle Eastern socio-political situation in 
which the potentially progressive, anti-imperialist national movements for Arab 
liberation rapidly turned exclusionary in an early stage of their own formation. 
Eventually acting along religiously dominated nationalist lines, Arab nationalisms 
did not manage to include ancient, loyal and fairly well integrated non-Zionist 
Arab-Jewish minority groups both in their political agenda for national liberation 
and in the formation of independent post-colonial Arab states. 
Thus Arab nationalism must be seen as a product of the Zionist impact on 
Arab anti-colonialist struggles and the failure of its leaders to distinguish between 
Jews and Zionists. Ironically this meant that Arab nationalist movements ended up 
reproducing the very Zionist discourses that they opposed, specifically the Zionist 
claim to speak on behalf of all Jews (Shohat 1999:13). It is this sequence of events 
that produced the “Arab Jewish dichotomy” and thus left Arab Jews on the margins of 
two restrictive and conflicting nationalisms, neither of which had space for their 
newly invented contradiction (ibid.).    19
Across the Arab world anti-Zionist riots led to violent, and sometimes fatal 
attacks on Arab Jews and their places of worship, their businesses and their schools, 
attacks that would mark the psyche of Arab Jews for generations (ibid.). Zionist forces 
were also behind attacks in an effort to whip up hysteria and panic amongst the Arab 
Jews, for instance cafes and synagogues were bombed in Iraq and blamed on sectarian 
Muslims, but were later found to be the work of Zionist agents (Giladi 1990:91; 
Shohat 1999:12).
19 The head of the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency, 
Yitzhak Rafael, admitted that with regard to the Jews of the Yemen, Zionist agents 
had hired Arabs to “speed up” their departure.
20 There were also secret collaborations 
between some Arab leaders and the Zionist leadership to encourage the Jewish 
inhabitants to leave, the collusion with the government of Nuri al-Said in Iraq is fairly 
notorious (Giladi 1990:84; Shohat 1999:12). And so Arab Jews began to leave the 
region their ancestors had inhabited for millennia – this is the other, not-so-well-
known side of Zionism’s displacement of the Palestinians; though they and the Arab 
Jews have been cast into antagonistic roles on opposite sides of the political and 
ideological border (Shohat 1999:12).
21 By failing to stop the attacks against the Jews 
and their subsequent departure, the Arab nationalist movements had in fact handed the 
Zionists a “great gift” because, as Behar (1997:6) explains, the post-1948 economy of 
Israel was by and large based on Arab Jewish immigrants who were effectively 
utilized by the European Zionist state not only economically but also politically, 
demographically and militarily. 
3.5  “Jews in the Form of Arabs” 
The journey to Israel was brutal, many Jews were forced onto ships against their will 
which were characterised by gross overcrowding and unsanitary conditions.
 22, 
23 The 
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young men were generally separated from their families and sent directly to Israel to 
join the army, others were taken to immigrant camps (ma`barot) in places such as 
Marseille in France to await their transportation to Israel (Giladi 1990:96). A letter 
from a doctor
24 in the transit camp of Marseille to the Immigration Department in 
Israel illustrated the deplorable and discriminatory conditions North African 
immigrants were suffering: 
… they have almost no clothes and have had nothing to eat during the three-day 
journey by ship. Conditions on board are horrific…There is a great lack of 
blankets in the two camps in Marseille…As a result of the dreadful living 
conditions and the deterioration in the standard of nourishment lately, twelve 
children have died…I fail to understand why clothing is distributed to all European 
immigrants, whereas nothing goes to the North Africans? 
Giladi (1990:99) argues that the conditions in the camps served to get rid of 
the weak, sick and aged so that only the strong and healthy would be absorbed in 
Israel. This analysis, he argues, is supported by the role Arab Jewish immigrants were 
assigned to fulfil, namely to serve as a supply of cheap labour and as demographic 
cannon fodder for the newly created Jewish state. As much of European Jewry, which 
the Zionist leadership saw as the prime candidates for immigration to Palestine, had 
been annihilated by the Nazis – Ben Gurion stated that this had destroyed ‘the main 
and central constructive power of the Jewish state’ – the mass importation of Arab 
Jews became a demographic and economic necessity for the newly created state 
(Massad 1996:56).
25 Without the Arab Jews there would have been no cheap Jewish 
labour to service the massive construction, agricultural and military demands of the 
state, and instead Palestinian labour would have had to be relied upon; which for 
ideological, but also importantly, demographic and political reasons was not viable. 
Therefore by presenting the mass importation of Arab Jews as a “rescue operation” 
from their oppressive and backward Arab countries of origin, the Zionist state masked 
its own need to rescue itself from political and economic collapse (Shohat 1999:10). 
For Zionists it was absolutely essential that a de facto majority Jewish population be 
created on the land of Palestine, which explains their efforts to recruit “Jews in the 
form of Arabs” to Israel (ibid.); despite the Zionist disregard for non-Ashkenazim in 
the  early  days  of  the  Zionist  project,  and  even  despite  the  concerns  of  Zionists 
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 regarding the demographic “make-up” of the Jewish settlement. It was the arrival of 
over 450,000 Arab Jews between 1948-56 (Allouche 2003:24) that provided the 
Jewish demographic majority in historic Palestine (in combination with the expulsion 
of the indigenous Palestinian population). But this was also perceived as creating an 
“internal” demographic threat within the Jewish population as the increasing number 
of Arab Jews threatened to outnumber European Jews and this was seen as 
jeopardizing the desired “Western” character of the Jewish state (Melamed 2005:21). 
And as will be shown, the population balance between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews 
became a major demographic issue for the Zionist establishment, with specific 
emphasis placed on the differential fertility rates of the Ashkenazim and Mizrahim.  
CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1  Population & Fertility Trends 
This chapter will discuss changes in the composition of the population and then 
proceed to analyse the various fertility patterns by first presenting and describing the 
collected data and then by discussing the explanations given for the fertility changes 
in demographic and sociological literature. It should be noted that the Israeli Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) does not group Jews into categories of Ashkenazim and 
Mizrahim. The categories for classifying the different ethnicities of Jews are 
“Europe/America born”, “Asia born”, “Africa born”; and for those born in Israel 
“Europe/America origin”, “Asia origin”, “Africa origin”. It is further complicated by 


























Jewish Population Distribution in Israel by Geographic Origin 
Source: Courbage (1999:33)
*Excluding 2003   22
Mizrahim. Giladi (1990:6) states that the exact figures for the population of Mizrahim 
are not disseminated for ‘security’ reasons and that these categories have been 
constructed deliberately to render statistical analysis problematical. For this reason I 
have had to rely on the previous calculations of demographers and sociologists, 
however where possible I shall provide the most up-to-date statistics.  
The graph above illustrates the composition of the Jewish population from 
1961 to 2003. The graph shows that Jews of Asian and African origin grew to be the 
majority in the Jewish population, Courbage (1999:32) states that this growth is a 
result both of immigration and their higher levels of fertility. After the 1990s the 
Mizrahi Jews lost their majority status due to the wave of new immigrants from the 
former Soviet Union (ibid.). Though there has been substantial immigration from 
Ethiopia this is outweighed by the immigration from the former Soviet Union. The 
source of the 2003 data comes from the Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2004 (table 
2.12). Because of the “Father born in Israel” classification, which includes both 
Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, this data has not been added to the population 
calculations and so the overall population numbers appear to have decreased since 
1996 but this is not the case. The 2003 calculations do not represent the distribution of 
the geographical origin of the total number of Jews in Israel, only the geographical 
origin of the number of Jews who themselves were born outside of Israel or whose 
fathers were born outside of Israel. The statistic that is generally given as the most up-
to-date estimate for the entire Jewish population of Israel is that the ratio now remains 
fairly even between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews, with Mizrahi Jews accounting for 
just under half of the Jewish population of Israel (Beinin 2000; Kananneh 2002:234). 
Though according to Chetrit (2000:63) many of the immigrants from the former 
Soviet Union are in fact Sephardic Jews despite the fact that they have been counted 
as Ashkenazim and so it is likely that the proportion of non-Ashkenazi Jews is in 
actuality much higher. If the 1.3 million Palestinian citizens of Israel (19.3% of the 
population)
26 are added to the proportion of Mizrahi Jews it can be seen that the total 
non-European population of Israel is just under 70%, which means that the majority 
of  Israeli  citizens  are  actually  of  Arab  descent.
27  But  despite  their  demographic 
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minority, European-Israelis are visibly dominant in every sector – in politics, 
education, the economy and culture (Shohat 1999:8). The minority status of European 
Jews is disguised by the official state terminology which never refers to the Mizrahim 
as “Arab Jews” but as “African-Asian Jews” and always refers to the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel as “Israeli Arabs”, never Palestinians. The use of the term “Israeli 
Arab” instead of “Palestinian” is not only an attempt to sanitize and rewrite a brutal 
and politically threatening history but also conveniently erases the existence of other 
Arabs in the country – the Arab Jews (Kanaaneh 2002:11). 
This graph illustrates the total fertility rates of Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews 
between 1955 and 2000. The data for the years 1995 and 2000 were sourced from the 
Statistical Abstract of Israel 2001 (table 3.12) which showed the fertility rates for 
women born in Asia & Africa, women born in Europe & America and women born in 
Israel. The graph above shows only the data for the first two categories, the fertility 
rate for women born in Israel is left out for the reasons discussed previously. The 
graph illustrates the rapid fertility decline of Jewish women from Asia and Africa 
between 1955 and 1980. In fact the total fertility rate halved in this time with 5.7 
being the average number of children per woman in 1955 to 3.04 children per woman 
in 1980. The fertility rate has remained steady at around 3.1 children per woman for 
the last twenty years. The fertility of Ashkenazi women has fluctuated slightly over 
time, rising in the 1970s to a high of 2.8 children per woman, and declining slightly in 
the 1990s to an average of 2.2 children per woman (ibid.). It can be seen that the 






















Total Fertility Rate of Jews in Israel by Continent of Birth, 1955-2000   24
considerably, though Mizrahi women still have, on average, one child more than 
Ashkenazi women. The widening gap in the fertility rates shown on the graph is a 
result of the arrival of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who have a lower 
fertility rate than other Ashkenazi Jews, and the arrival of immigrants from Ethiopia 
who have boosted the percentage of Asian-African Jews who tend to have higher 
fertility rates (Courbage 1999:34). 
The reasons given for the rapid fertility decline of Mizrahi Jews in mainstream 
Israeli sociological and demographic discourse have largely centred around the typical 
explanations provided by the school of Modernisation theory. These analyses have 
concluded that the Mizrahi fertility decline was a response to ‘the exposure to a 
modern economy and to Israeli culture’ and as a result Asian and African immigrants 
adapted to ‘modernised patterns of fertility regulation behaviour, typical of 
populations in the developed countries of the West’ (Goldscheider & Friedlander 
1986; Okun 1997). Much of the literature concentrates on the positive association 
between the length of exposure to Israeli society and the effect on family-size 
limitation for Asian-African immigrants as Goldscheider (1996:213) has stated: ‘As 
length of exposure to the norms and values of Israeli society and to the institutions 
that shape the lives of those married and educated in Israel increases, fertility 
patterns lose their ethnic distinctiveness.’ There is thus a general consensus that the 
fertility transition of the Mizrahim followed the improvement in mortality rates; 
increased access to education; improvements in the socioeconomic conditions and the 
exposure to “Israeli norms of behaviour” – which implies the “rationalisation” of 
fertility behaviour as the Mizrahim adapted to “modern ways of thinking” concerning 
the negative association between the number of children and the amount of 
investment in each child (Friedlander et al 1980:583; Goldscheider 1996:213; Okun 
1997:319). While it is not doubted that the decrease in mortality rates over time 
played an important role in the reduction of Mizrahi fertility, many of the other 
explanations contradict the fact that the Mizrahim have not adequately benefited from 
Israel’s socioeconomic development and still overwhelmingly occupy (together with 
the Palestinians) the lower strata in society, particularly in the areas of income, 
education and housing (see Chapter five). Indeed the graph below shows various 
socioeconomic data for different municipalities distinguished by their majority 
Ashkenazi, Mizrahi or Palestinian populations and it illustrates the marked differences 
in the social and economic characteristics of the different municipalities. The data for   25
the graph was compiled by selecting, at random, five towns where the population is 
largely Ashkenazi and then calculating the average of their values for each category. 
The same was calculated for five development towns which are all overwhelmingly 
inhabited by Mizrahim and for five towns inhabited mainly by Palestinians. (For the 
individual values of each of the towns chosen see table 1 in the Appendix.)  
 
The pattern in the socioeconomic characteristics of the different municipalities 
is clear: the towns with an Ashkenazi majority are the highest up on the economic and 
educational scale; the towns set up for the Mizrahim are well below the Ashkenazi 
municipalities in their income and educational level but are slightly better off than the 
Palestinian localities. Indeed it is interesting to note that the development towns are 
closer to the Palestinian localities than the Ashkenazi towns in many of the categories, 
particularly concerning the number of twice average wage earners, work seekers and 
the number of students. This indicates a similarity in the lack of employment and 
educational opportunities for the residents in these municipalities. Yet in the largely 
Mizrahi towns, the percentage of families with four or more children is less than half 
the percentage of families with four or more children in the Palestinian localities. If 
the Mizrahi fertility decline was a result of their increasing modernisation due to the 
‘exposure’ to Ashkenazi-Israeli society, then why is this group consistently 
underperforming in measures of socioeconomic development compared to the 
Ashkenazim? It can be seen that the Mizrahim occupy a very different position to the 

























Comparison of Municipalities by Various Socioeconomic Data 
Source: Israeli CBS, 
local authorities & mu-
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sociological and demographic literature has stated that it was the ‘forces of 
modernisation’ that were responsible for the rapid fertility decline, I contend that it 
was the pervasiveness of the modernisation discourse itself, and its role in masking 
the calculated discriminatory distributional policies of the Israeli state, that has played 
a significant part in the reproductive decision making of Mizrahi Jews favouring 
lower fertility.  
It is recognised that there will have been a variety of factors in the 
reproductive decision making process that will have had different levels of 
significance for different groups of people – women of different ages, of different 
means, in rural or urban areas, and between men and women – and this reflects the 
complexity of reproductive decisions, as they are the result of individuals and couples 
negotiating different sets of demands for which there is often no optimal solution. But 
given the highly racialised nature of the class structure in Israel and the ambivalent 
status of the Arab Jewish identity, social mobility necessarily depends on suppressing 
any “aspect” that is perceived to be connected with “Arabness”, and on presenting an 
image of a modern, Westernised Jew to fit with the Euro-Israeli discourse on 
modernity:  
All that is Mizrakhi is retarded, degenerate, and primitive, and therefore I had to 
choose the Ashkenazi alternative – I had to Ashkenazi-size myself (become 
“white”). For me this meant establishing a modern, progressive, clean identity and 
destroying, down to the roots, the identity my parents gave me. This meant 
rejecting everything: their past, their language, their values… (Dahan Kalev 
2001:4) 
Considering that notions of the modern (and pre-modern) are inextricably 
bound up in constructions of the family, specifically the Malthusian connection 
between large families, poverty and backwardness; the small, Westernised, nuclear 
family has therefore been posited as the ideal modern family unit. The pervasiveness 
of the language of modernisation in labelling Mizrahim as “pre-modern” and 
“primitive”, in order to justify their position in the lower socioeconomic strata of 
Israeli society, and the use of this same narrative to deny the deliberate racialised 
formation of class structures in Israel; has powerfully shaped and defined the options 
through which social mobility for Mizrahim in Israeli society is perceived as possible. 
It is argued therefore, that a desire to be free from the stigmas attached to large family 
size and its association with poverty and backwardness, and indeed “Arabness”, 
played a significant part in the fertility decline of the Mizrahim. A similar argument is   27
made in the work of Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh (2002) on the reproductive strategies of 
Palestinian women in Israel:  
Reproductive practices and discourses have become an important marker of self 
and other because, they are a central framework in Israeli definitions of self and 
Palestinian other…Israeli views are dominated by images of Palestinians as 
breeders, irrational out-of-control reproducers... The rhetoric of development and 
modernization – that “they” need to stop breeding – here is heightened and takes 
on strong racial overtones……It is thus ironic that Palestinians have come to 
mimic this structure by defining themselves in terms of fertility and using 
reproductive control as a measure of modernity or alternatively, Arab authenticity. 
It is not surprising, however, that options for empowerment and 
advancement…largely follow lines of power that Palestinians simultaneously are 
subject to and try to resist. It is not uncommon that dominant structures define the 
few means through which empowerment is conceivable… (p. 105-6) 
Thus the argument is not one that implies a simple conformity to the dominant 
discursive structures but rather it suggests a negotiation, a strategy, for greater social 
mobility and access to resources. Though this strategy by no means guarantees greater 
mobility or improved socioeconomic standing, but given the Mizrahi context where 
the structure of opportunities has been tightly defined and controlled (which is even 
more restrictive for the Palestinian population) it can be seen that routes for 
socioeconomic advancement are limited. And indeed, negotiations of identity through 
reproductive discourses and practices are not just abstract debates about identity and 
modernity – the repercussions of being labelled “reproductively primitive” or 
“reproductively modern” can be felt in very unabstract ways (Kanaaneh 2002:107). It 
is not surprising that the language used to describe the reproductive habits of the 
Palestinians is the same that has been used to describe the reproductive practices of 
the Mizrahim; in fact the official discourse has attributed the inferior socioeconomic 
status of Mizrahi Jews both to their origins in “pre-modern” societies and their high 
fertility (see Chapters five & six). Thus the common language of modernisation and 
Malthusian theory has been utilised to effectively excuse the racialised class 
formations of Israeli society for the underdevelopment of Mizrahim, and Palestinians 
(Shohat 1998:15; Melamed 2005:36). 
Though the decrease in Mizrahi fertility cannot solely be attributed to the 
dominance of the Euro-Israeli modernisation discourse and its relationship to the class 
formation of Israeli society and the Arab Jewish identity dilemma. And indeed this 
paper recognises that increased marriage ages; compulsory army service for young 
women; increased access to higher education for some Mizrahi women; and even the 
constraints of poverty itself such as inadequate housing, low incomes; and the dual   28
pressures of work and childcare, will have been, to differing extents, important factors 
in the trend toward lower fertility. The fact that mainstream Israeli sociological 
literature has nested itself in the “safety” of demographic transition theory, which 
provides uncontroversial explanations for the Mizrahi fertility transition, thus finds its 
perfect match in establishment needs, denying any disjuncture in the integration, or 
“modernisation”, of the Asian-African Jews into Western Israeli society. The next few 
chapters will therefore illustrate the devastating consequences the Zionist 
modernisation discourse and its policies have had for Mizrahim (Shohat 1998:5). 
They will explore the relationship between identity and the formation and 
preservation of class structures and its effect on the reproductive discourse as it relates 
to the Mizrahim, and consider how this reproductive discourse has, in turn, shaped the 
processes of class and racial formation in Israel in an ever dynamic process (Melamed 
2005:16). This will demonstrate the dominant language of modernisation and 
Malthusianism in policy and public discourse, revealing the limited opportunities 
available to Mizrahim for increased socioeconomic well-being and enable us to 
appreciate the power reproductive “othering” has had on strategies for social mobility. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5.1  Class & Racial Formation in Israel 
After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 the Zionist establishment was not only 
concerned with settling the land but also with the crucial task of constructing different 
socioeconomic classes for the development of its industrial capitalist economy 
(Hanieh 2002). The formation of these classes continued along the same trajectory 
that had been established in the pre-state period but on a much larger scale and so the 
discriminatory systems by which resources were allocated became more complex. 
Upon arrival in Israel systematic measures were taken to strip Arab Jews of 
their Arabic identity: They were given Hebrew names to replace their traditional 
Arabic names, ‘“Said” became “Hayyim”, “Su`ad” became “Tamar”’ (Giladi 1990: 
104). Yemeni Jews were shorn of their sidelocks and in some cases their clothes were 
taken from them and exchanged for European clothes instead (ibid.). They were then 
taken to the transit camps (ma`barot) which had been erected outside Ashkenazi 
settlements or large cities (Massad 1996:56). These camps consisted of rows of tents 
that later became tin or wooden huts and then were built of cement and consisted of   29
no more than a single room (Giladi 1990:106). At the Zionist Executive Council in 
March 1949 it was asserted that the state was moving towards erecting slums and 
causing chronic overcrowding (ibid.). There was a serious lack of medical facilities 
and sanitation services, outbreaks of disease were rife, and the child mortality rate was 
much higher than in the large cities and in the Ashkenazi settlements (Ibid:123). The 
discrimination between the treatment of the Ashkenazim and the Arab Jews was 
evident – only Ashkenazi Jews were given the homes of the displaced Palestinian 
population or newly built houses (Massad 1996:58; Giladi 1990:111). Though many 
Ashkenazi Jews had to live in the transit camps also, they were separated from the 
non-Ashkenazim, and Shohat (1998:14) reports that they were given privileges that 
the non-Ashkenazim did not experience: Their housing needs were prioritised and 
they did not have to spend the years most Mizrahi Jews did waiting for proper 
housing. The calculated discrimination against Mizrahi Jews waiting in the transit 
camps compared to Jews from Europe is demonstrated in the minutes of the meetings 
of the Zionist Executive Council who were discussing preparations for the arrival of 
Polish immigrants:
 28 ‘We have got to hurry so that we won’t be taken by surprise, and 
so that respectable people will not be forced to go to the camps. There are people of 
rank amongst the immigrants and it will be a disaster if we are forced to send them to 
the camps.’ Racist attitudes that saw Europeans as cultured and knowledgeable and 
therefore requiring better living conditions than immigrants from non-European 
countries whose ‘level of development was far behind the more advanced 
Ashkenazim’ were widespread as is illustrated by this statement recorded at the 
Zionist Executive Council meeting:
29 
The Polish immigrants are not like immigrants from other countries….If we 
exempt them from the camps and give them priority in housing, they will settle 
down much more quickly than the Orientals in the camps for there are amongst 
them professionals who are much in need in the country…The Jews of Poland 
come from a comfortable background and thus camp life would be more difficult 
for them than for Yemenite Jews who consider the camps a rescue operation… 
After the initial provision of rations and social services the government 
informed the camp residents that they needed to provide for themselves (Massad 
1996:58). The camps thus supplied an army of workers to the nearby cities and 
                                                           
28 Zionist Executive Council Minutes 26
th December 1949, quoting Greenbaum, cited in Giladi 
(1990:112). 
29 Ibid, quoting Rafael, cited in Giladi (1990:113).   30
Ashkenazi settlements (Giladi 1990:115). Regardless of educational or skill levels, the 
lack of opportunities forced many Mizrahim to take up poorly-paid menial jobs 
(Massad 1996:58). And indeed documents reveal that discrimination against 
Mizrahim was a calculated policy that knowingly privileged European immigrants, at 
times creating anomalous   situations   where   educated   Arab  Jewish immigrants 
became unskilled labourers while much less educated Ashkenazim occupied much 
higher administrative positions (Shohat 1998:14). In the camps themselves the top 
employment posts such as camp director, labour office director and intelligence 
officer were all occupied by Ashkenazim, the only positions available in the camps 
for Mizrahim were as sanitation workers (Giladi 1990:118). The predominance of the 
Mapai party (Labour) in government and in the Histadrut, meant that it enjoyed wide 
control over the political and economic system, including employment, health care 
and housing. Its practice of favouritism and of providing jobs and other services in 
exchange for votes was widespread: ‘in the period of the elections we created havoc 
in the cooperative immigrant villages and in the transit camps by meaningless 
promises and by the base system of vote buying’.
30 This also meant that criticism of 
the government in relation to their discriminatory treatment was suppressed as those 
who complained were liable to lose their jobs, or fail to get a job at all, and were less 
likely to receive proper non-temporary housing. Residents of the camps were also 
unable to take part in local council elections as they were classified as “temporary 
residents” (Massad 1996:59) and the Ashkenazi councils in whose jurisdiction the 
camps lay had little contact with those in the camps (Giladi 1990:119). Thus health 
and education services were extremely lacking, the camps were not linked to the 
electricity grid and there were no surfaced roads linking the camps with the 
neighbouring municipalities (Ibid:122). This meant that few doctors and medical 
supplies were available and that a substantial portion of the children in camps never 
attended school, despite Israel’s compulsory education policy (Ibid:126). A study 
conducted in 1958 about the camps in the Beer Sheva region found that a third of 
children aged between 6 and 13 did not go to school and of those that did 90 percent 
left before fourth grade (ibid.). The proportion of Mizrahim in  secondary  school  was 
                                                           
30 Yosephtal G ‘Life & Works’ 1963 cited in Massad (1996:59).   31
 close to zero (ibid.).
31  
Thus the educational disparities between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim did in 
fact exist early on, but this was not because of the lack of educational opportunities in 
their countries of origin (which as has been explained earlier, in Arab countries 
Jewish educational establishments had been prioritised by the colonial government), it 
was the lack of educational services provided to the Mizrahi immigrants in Israel that 
was the cause of this disparity. This is significant because Israel sees itself as the 
“great moderniser” which has brought the immigrants from the Arab world up to its 
“advanced standard of civilisation”. But yet, as will be shown, it is the Israeli 
“civilising” or “modernising project”, which has continually generated the 
underdevelopment of the Mizrahim (Shohat 1998:20).  
By 1952 Mizrahi immigrants, mostly Moroccans, were being sent to 
“development towns” which were set up exclusively for the 
“development”/“modernisation” of the Mizrahim (Massad 1996:58). The 
development towns are located in remote parts of the Negev desert or near the 
Lebanese border area and were set up for ‘economic, security and settlement reasons’ 
(Giladi 1990:129). In other words to supply Ashkenazi settlements with a constant 
source of cheap labour; to settle remote districts with Jews to prevent the return of the 
displaced Palestinian population; and to protect Ashkenazi settlements from 
Palestinian guerrilla activity (the development towns due to their situation on frontier 
areas became the target of Palestinian attacks (Massad 1996:58)). According to Giladi 
(1990:129) settling Mizrahi immigrants in these towns was a much cheaper method of 
absorption than the transit camps since it was direct and permanent. Semyonov & 
Lewin-Epstein  (2004:4) report that in 2004 ‘these [development] towns that are 
characterised by labour intensive industrial structure and limited occupational 
opportunities are [still] inhabited mostly by North Africans.’ Most of the development 
towns are set up around one factory or quarry that is owned by the state, the Histadrut 
                                                           
31 The desperate situation of those in the camps is reflected in this excerpt of a letter written to the 
Prime Minister by residents of Camp Bet and Camp Gimmel near the town of Ramleh in 1954: ‘The 
overwhelming majority of residents are unemployed or partially employed…We have lived in these 
dreadful conditions for more than three years with no interest or help from government or municipal 
establishments. There are 8-10 people per hut and we are living amidst mounds of filth….A large 
percentage of our children is not sent to school due to a shortage of financial resources. We have one 
doctor and one nurse for 5,000 people. W e have no paved road connecting the camp to the town…The 
Social Welfare Office gives the needy 4-8 Israeli pounds a month, but this small sum is not enough to 
solve the problem since it is nowhere near enough to support a family of 6-8 members…’. Cited in 
Giladi (1990:123).   32
or Ashkenazi businesses (Massad 1996:58). Indeed over 85 percent of the factory 
managers in the development towns are Ashkenazi though they themselves do not live 
in the towns (ibid.). The industries that have received the most government support 
are textiles and food, which do not require huge amounts of capital but which need 
plenty of cheap unskilled labour (Giladi 1990:130). The wages in the development 
towns are much lower than in the rest of the country, even within the same industry 
(Massad 1996:58): A report in 2001 into inequality in Israeli society showed that the 
salary of an Ashkenazi employee was on average one and a half times greater than 
that of a Mizrahi employee (Swirski & Konor-Attias 2001:8). The racialised structure 
of employment in Israeli society explains why 88 percent of upper income Israelis are 
Ashkenazim while 60 percent of low income families are Mizrahim (Wurmser 
2005:5). It also illustrates that Israel’s rapid economic development in the fifties and 
sixties was achieved on the basis of a systematic unequal distribution of advantages, 
which relegated Mizrahi Jews ‘to a future-less bottom [and] propelled Ashkenazim up 
the social scale, creating mobility in management, marketing, banking and technical 
jobs’ (Shohat 1998:14). 
In education the services provided in development towns are poor, there are 
high drop out and repetition rates, and this is reflected in the fact that as late as 2000 
there was still only one Mizrahi with a university degree for every four Ashkenazim 
with the equivalent (Wurmser 2005:5). Due to the high unemployment and poor 
educational opportunities large numbers of Mizrahim have left the development 
towns. And thus the poor districts of the cities spread and the poverty deepened, 
Giladi (1990:149) comments that  
the only basic difference between the development towns and the slum areas is 
geographic. The development towns lie in the country and supply Ashkenazi 
settlements with cheap labour whereas the slum areas form a belt around the large 
towns and supply Ashkenazi capital with cheap labour. 
The socioeconomic differences between the predominantly Mizrahi 
development towns and the Ashkenazi settlements is striking, as is the difference in 
state support given to these communities: When a new Ashkenazi settlement is set up 
the state immediately provides it with enough good quality land for agricultural 
production, with the necessary means of production such as livestock and machinery, 
together with annual allowances for subsistence and development (Giladi 
1990:144).The Ashkenazi kibbutzim have received 54 percent of all state funds   33
invested in agriculture despite the fact they constitute 12 percent of Israel’s 
agricultural settlement (Massad 1996:58). Moreover the Ashkenazi settlements were 
built in the centre of the country which facilitated the marketing of their produce 
compared to the Mizrahi agricultural cooperatives that were located in remote areas 
(ibid.). Indeed the peripheral physical locality of the majority of the Mizrahi 
population symbolises their location on the socioeconomic periphery of Israeli 
society. 
In the slums of the cities and large towns there is chronic overcrowding and 
many generations live together in two or three rooms at most (Giladi 1990:150). The 
building of unlicensed extensions was a method many families have resorted to when 
a son or daughter got married as they could not afford to rent or buy new apartments. 
But if an extra room was built without planning permission it was knocked down by 
the authorities (ibid.).
32 The government owns a number of public housing apartments 
which are managed by different public housing companies, and whose tenants are 
primarily Mizrahi Jews (Yonah & Saporta 2002:95). However since 1997 the 
government has been trying to privatise the public housing sector, allowing tenants to 
purchase their apartments at straight market value but since much of the public 
housing in cities and large towns is on land real estate developers have been attracted 
to, tenants cannot afford to purchase their apartments at such high market values 
(ibid.). Shohat (1998:29) explains:  
The pattern is clear and systematic. The areas forcibly vacated by the Sephardim 
soon become the object of major investments leading to Ashkenazi gentrification, 
where the elite enjoys living within a “Mediterranean” mise-en-scene but without 
the inconvenience of a Palestinian or Sephardi presence, while the newly adopted 
Sephardi neighbourhoods become de-capitalized slums. 
The inequalities in space allocation for different ethnic groups are 
demonstrated by the fact that in the Negev, municipalities with an Ashkenazi majority 
cover 55.4 percent of the area though their residents constitute just 4.9 percent of the 
region’s population; whereas municipalities with Mizrahi majorities cover only 20.8 
percent of the area and have 62.1 percent of the population (Yiftachel 1998:10).
 33 
According to Yiftachel (1998:4) the politics of space is central to the organisation of 
                                                           
32 In 1982 this led to the shooting of a Yemeni Jew as he tried to resist the demolition of an extra room 
he had built on his house for him and his new spouse in order to alleviate the cramped conditions in the 
house where his family of nineteen were living in three small rooms (Giladi 1990:290). 
33 This is much worse for the Palestinian population of the Negev who cover only 1.5 percent of the 
region despite constituting 24.8 percent of the region’s population (Yiftachel 1998:10).   34
group relations as it determines to a large extent the reproduction of social inequalities 
and of group identities. The Ashkenazi elites and middle classes have been able to 
preserve their privileged position by creating an uneven division of space by 
controlling the state apparatus of urban and regional planning, directing the settlement 
of areas of the country and regulating land ownership and use (ibid.). The dominant 
Ashkenazi establishment has also constructed more subtle institutional barriers such 
as school districts and zoning regulations that serve to reinforce and reproduce the 
uneven distribution of resources and opportunities (ibid.). As has been shown the 
Ashkenazi establishment confined Mizrahi Jews to a separate housing market, one in 
which they did not have the choice in the type of housing or location. This process has 
encouraged geographical segregation not just in housing but also in schooling, 
employment and healthcare, and therefore perpetuated the connection between 
housing and socioeconomic status.
34 
In 1985 the government began restructuring the economy and adopted neo-
liberal economic policies, which have had massive impacts on many Mizrahim 
(Beinin 2000): After peace and trade agreements were signed, work in the 
“traditional” manufacturing industries, particularly textiles, have been outsourced to 
Egypt and Jordan where labour is much cheaper, and thus many manufacturing bases 
have been downscaled or have closed down altogether (ibid.). The national rate of 
unemployment has now risen to 11%, and this is much higher in the development 
towns.
35 These neo-liberal policies have also seen sharp cuts in government 
expenditures on health, education and welfare and a reduction in real wages (Hanieh 
2002). Indeed welfare payments to single mothers, the unemployed and pensioners 
were cut by a third in 2003.
36 This disproportionately affects the Mizrahim (along 
with the Palestinian citizens of Israel) who form the bulk of Israel’s poor and low 
income classes, and who are therefore the majority of welfare recipients (Melamed 
2005:40). The welfare cuts also disproportionately affect Mizrahi women as they are 
the majority of single mothers in Israel (Swiski et al 2003:16). Thus demonstrating the 
important intersection between gender and race in class formations that should not be 
underestimated. Indeed  this  is  starkly  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  over  a  third  of  
                                                           
34 Law-Yone & Kalus ‘Housing in Israel: Policy & Inequality’ cited in Yonah & Saporta (2002:110). 
35 The Guardian, ‘Trolley dash: the last resort of hungry Israelis’ 19/02/2004. 
36 Ibid.   35
Mizrahi women who are single mothers, live below the poverty line (Dahan Kalev 
2005:2). As a result of these policies the gaps between Israel’s rich and poor have 
widened even further and according to the Gini index, Israel ranks second only to the 
United States for inequality in the developed world (Hirschberg 2004). 
Despite the evidence which illustrates how classes were formed along distinct 
ethnic lines in Israel and even the collection of the minutes of the meetings of the 
Knesset and the Zionist establishment, which demonstrate the mass of calculated 
discriminatory policies toward Mizrahi Jews; it is still asserted, by politicians and 
academics alike, that it was the “superior skills” and the “cultural background” of the 
European  immigrants  that  has  led  to  the overwhelmingly European presence in the 
middle and upper middle classes of Israeli society. This analysis from Semyonov & 
Lewin-Epstein (2004:4) of the Israeli Sociological Society is typical:  
The immigrants that arrived from Europe after Israel’s independence were able to 
rapidly ascend the socioeconomic ladder both as a result of the favourable 
treatment from their compatriots who were in positions of influence and their 
cultural affinity with the dominant groups as well as the skills and the cultural 
orientation that were suitable for a rapidly growing modern economy. [My 
emphasis]  
Thus the channelling of the Mizrahim into peripheral locations, poorer 
housing, and the low-wage end of the labour market, together with the lack of 
educational opportunities, is purposefully ignored, and instead their “cultural 
orientation” is emphasised for their lack of success. The Mizrahim therefore still face 
the degradation of their heritage and identity so as to mask Israeli state policies that 
have marginalised them socially, economically and politically. It thus enables us to 
see, that while it is claimed that the Mizrahim have been “modernised” by Ashkenazi 
Israeli society, in fact the reverse is true, as it was the cheap labour provided by 
Mizrahi mass immigration that has made Ashkenazi “modernity” possible in Israel 
(Shohat 1998:17). 
5.2 Resistance  &  Identity 
Wherever there is exploitation and repression there will be resistance. This resistance 
often takes many forms and extends well beyond organised protest to include far more 
nuanced, subtler forms of dissent that are often overlooked. Indeed there has been a 
steady stream of what Sami Shalom Chetrit (2000:52) calls “passive radicalism” 
involving disobedience of the law, low rates of conscription in to the military and high 
dropout rates from school. The founding of the Black Panthers in 1971 was the   36
watershed event which heralded a new Mizrahi discourse (ibid.). They took their 
name from the black revolutionary struggle in the United States and were the first to 
draw parallels with their oppression and similar situations around the world, 
particularly the movement of their namesake (ibid.).They were also the first Mizrahim 
in politics to make the connection between the discrimination against the Palestinians 
and their own communities (ibid.). Not surprisingly they were targeted by the 
establishment and due to many factors including the lack of political experience and 
organisation the movement collapsed (ibid.). However the Black Panthers had a 
formidable impact on Israeli politics and on the construction of the Mizrahi identity. 
However for the purposes of this research what shall be discussed here is the 
Wadi Salib uprising of 1959, named after the Wadi Salib slum area of Haifa where the 
protests began. The immediate cause was the provision of newly built housing to 
recently arrived Polish immigrants, that had been earmarked for Mizrahi families still 
living in slum conditions (Giladi 1990:253). Then rumours swept through the 
neighbourhood that a Moroccan had been shot dead by the police during the protests 
and riots began (Massad 1996:60). Political activists called for an end to the 
Ashkenazi discrimination and hegemony and the riots later spread across the country 
throughout Mizrahi camps and slum areas (ibid.). The government responded by 
delegitimising the leaders labelling them “criminals” and “hooligans”; adding that 
they were trying to create sectarian divisions amongst the Jewish people (ibid.). The 
Israeli state has developed effective means for dealing with the organised dissent of 
the Mizrahim: the typical strategy is to co-opt key figures in these movements with 
apartments and jobs, and reiterate to the public the critical necessity of “Jewish 
national unity”. Indeed the Wadi Salib uprising was largely diffused by the massive 
co-optation of leading activists in the rebellion (Chetrit 2000:53). This is significant as 
it illustrates the extent to which the Mizrahi identity dilemma is part of maintaining 
the organised class structures in Israeli society as the dichotomy between “Arab” and 
“Jew” discourages solidarity and cooperation with the Palestinians, as “Arabness” is 
the lowest rung on the socioeconomic ladder and simply leads to rejection (Shohat 
1999:16); whilst “Jewishness”, is perceived to provide access to a valued identity, 
nationalist alliances and the benefits of the modern Jewish state. Thus the belief is 
created that there is no intra-Jewish discrimination, all the Mizrahim have to do to   37
progress in society is become “Israeli” by forgetting their history, dropping their 
accent and discarding their “Arabness” – in fact they just have to “Ashkenazify”.
37 
This serves to keep the majority of Mizrahim loyal to the Israeli state by co-opting 
them into the nationalist narrative and its duplicitous promises of solidarity, security 
and modernity.  
CHAPTER SIX 
6.1  “Quality Control”: Concerns in the Zionist Establishment 
In the face of growing Yemenite immigration to Palestine, Vladmir Jabotinsky, the 
leader of Zionist Revisionism, was adamant that Ashkenazi Jews preserve their 
majority status in Palestine, and moreover expressed his opposition to marriages 
between Ashkenazi and non-Ashkenazi Jews because he did not know if this would be 
beget ‘a brilliant people or a dull race’.
38 In fact, as was discussed earlier, the Zionist 
establishment was not too keen, in the beginning, on bringing Jews from Arab 
countries to Israel at all: ‘There are countries, and here I am talking about the 
countries of North Africa, whose Jews need not emigrate. It is not a question of the 
number of people, but of their quality.’
39 These statements regarding the “quality” of 
non-Ashkenazi Jews were echoed by many of Israel’s founding members and reveal 
the eugenic concerns that are inextricably bound up in the Zionist narrative itself:  
For Ashkenazim, Zionism represented a movement of transformation, in 
which the European Jews, perpetually marginalised, could be reborn as the “new 
Jews”, free from the stigmas of old. The “new Jew” would be physically strong, agile 
and without the weaknesses that had been perceived to plague them in the Diaspora 
(Khazzoom 2003:493). In the pre-state Zionist establishment much emphasis was 
placed on generating the desired characteristics of the “new Jew” and indeed Sachlav 
Stoler-Liss has researched some of the eugenic proposals such as castrating the 
mentally ill and sterilizing the poor advocated by key figures in the Zionist 
establishment.
40 These included Joseph Meir, who served as head of the Israeli Sick 
                                                           
37 Conversations with Dr Smadar Lavie, 28/09/05, Tel Aviv & Dr Rafi Shubeli, 29/09/05, Rehovot. 
38 Jabotinsky V ‘Jews of the East’ 1919 cited in Haaretz 22
nd July 1983. 
39 Quoting Moshe Sharett, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Shared Report 12
th December 1948 cited 
in Massad (1996:56). 
40 See “Do not have children if they won’t be healthy!”  Haaretz 11/07/2004.   38
Fund (Kupat Holim) for thirty years, and who explicitly stated in 1934 that European 
Jewish mothers had an obligation to bear only healthy children:  
Who should be allowed to raise children? Seeking the right answer to this ques-
tion, eugenics is the science that tries to refine the human race and keep it from de-
caying… Doctors, athletes, and politicians should spread the idea widely: Do not 
have children unless you are sure that they will be healthy, both mentally and 
physically.
41  
Stoler-Liss (2003:110) demonstrates that those in the Zionist establishment 
saw connections between the Zionist movement and Social Darwinism, believing that 
Zionist children tended to be taller and stronger than those from non-Zionist circles as 
only the strongest and healthiest Jews accepted Zionism. Physicians and psychologists 
in the Zionist movement went to great lengths imposing an onslaught of information, 
indoctrination and systems of regulation on European Jewish women throughout their 
childbearing years in order to ensure the high quality (European) Jewish population 
they perceived as essential for building the Jewish state (Ibid:104). Indeed many of 
the population “quality” concerns expressed by the Zionist establishment are 
reminiscent of those levelled at Jews in European anti-Semitic discourse. In this 
discourse Jews were characterised as dark, dirty and poor and chastised for having too 
many children (Khazzoom 2003:490&495). These characterisations echo in the 
Ashkenazi descriptions of the Mizrahim (and the Palestinians), also portrayed as dirty, 
lazy and poor, along with other pejorative descriptions (Dahan Kalev 2001). In anti-
Semitic Europe the Jews were constructed as backward and inferior precisely because 
they came from the East and so were orientalised by a Europe that wished to define 
itself in opposition to the Eastern “other” (Khazzoom 2003:491). Khazzoom 
illustrates how these Orientalist stigmas were internalized through a complex process 
and then imposed on another group (the Jews from the Arab world & the Palestinians) 
through Zionism as part of the destigmatization process of the Jews from Europe. This 
process is clearly explained by Shohat (1998:31):  
The leitmotif of Zionist texts was the cry to be a “normal civilized nation”, without 
the “distortions” and forms of pariahdom “typical” of the gola (diaspora), of the 
state of being a non nation-state. The “Ostjuden”, perennially marginalized by 
Europe, realized their desire of becoming Europe, ironically, in the Middle East, 
this time on the backs of their own “Ostjuden”, the Eastern Jews. 
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Thus Israel continuously represents itself as a Western entity with a solid 
East/West dichotomy because by defining other groups (the Mizrahim & the Pales-
tinians) as defective it simultaneously reinforces its own (Ashkenazi) more favourable 
identity. Importantly this is then used to legitimize the Ashkenazi dominance and mo-
nopolization of resources (Khazzoom 2003:483).  
The potency of the Orientalist narrative and its committed relationship to 
Modernisation theory is clearly visible in its application to the Mizrahim and thus 
demonstrates its capacity for being reshaped, reproduced and transposed according to 
the needs of the dominant group (ibid.). Indeed Israel’s leading intellectuals spent 
great efforts researching what was termed the “primitive mentality” of the Mizrahi 
Jews: Karl Frankenstein, a celebrated professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem 
and the man considered the founder of the Israeli education system, wrote ‘the 
primitive mentality of many of the immigrants from backward countries can be 
compared to that of the primitive expression of children, the retarded or the mentally 
disturbed’.
42 The “retarded mentality” of Mizrahi Jews was confirmed by such 
“scientific” analysis as described in the book ‘The Children of the Melah: The 
Cultural Retardation Among Moroccan Children and Its Meaning In Education’ by 
Fuerstein and Richel (1953) where they stated:  
Various non-verbal examinations conducted prove retardation of one to two years, 
and very often even more, in comparison with youth of similar age in Europe. Are 
we to interpret this as biological inferiority and to see their difficulties as an 
expression of lack of intellectual abilities and limitations in psycho physiological 
activity?
43  
This symbiosis of social science and biology was a deep-seated characteristic 
of mainstream Israeli sociology producing work centred on Social Darwinist notions. 
In more contemporary sociological research, mainstream Israeli academia has 
attached itself to the edifice of modernisation theory, which instead of explicitly 
linking poverty and underdevelopment to ethnic or racial inferiority, conveniently 
targets “traditions” and “culture” as explanations for social and economic inequality. 
Indeed Dahan-Kalev (2001) explains that the proximity of the founders of Israeli 
sociology to the Zionist project blurred the difference between the academy and the 
political  establishment  and  as  such,  the  “scientific”  conceptualisation  of  Mizrahi 
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defects in the spirit of modernisation theory, not only formed the contours of Israeli 
sociology but also constituted the basis of state policy. This is apparent in the analyses 
of the Mizrahi fertility decline which reproduce the official modernisation narrative, 
frequently citing “culture” as a reason for the “pre-modern” fertility rates of non-
European Jews (see Okun 1997). 
It can be seen that in orientalising the Mizrahim, the Ashkenazi elite simply 
took the arsenal of images and symbols that had been used to exclude them and 
applied them, largely unchanged, to the Mizrahim (Khazzoom 2003:500). One area 
where this is particularly conspicuous is the family: As the large families of European 
Jews had once been a symbol of their “otherness” and “inferiority”, family size 
became the signifier between “modern” and “pre-modern” Jews in Israel (Melamed 
2005:18; Khazzoom 2003:501). The larger family size of Mirzahi Jews was heavily 
stigmatized and Mizrahi Jews labelled as “irresponsible breeders” in media reports 
and in parliamentary debates (Melamed 2005:16). Even today in discussions on the 
economy and state benefits, “large families” are described as a burden on the state, 
and indeed the phrase “families of many children” has a racialised and degrading 
connotation in the Israeli context (ibid.). In fact by the late 1950s having a large 
family was beginning to be embarrassing, as mothers with many children were 
ridiculed by medical staff and social workers.
44 Indeed because large families were 
beginning to be seen as a marker of social inferiority this prompted some members of 
the Zionist establishment to issue statements regarding the respect that should be 
accorded to mothers of large families, as it was felt this attitude was harming the 
demographic needs of the state (Melamed 2005:34).  
The fact that higher fertility is implicated as a cause and signifier of poverty is 
testament to the widespread presence of Malthusian rationale in Israeli social policies, 
educational materials, the media and society (see Kanaaneh 2002). In fact Melamed 
(2005:15) states that Malthusianism is more than just a population theory; it is in 
actuality a powerful cultural and political discourse that not only provides a 
“justification” for understanding high fertility as a causal mechanism for poverty and 
underdevelopment, but is also a highly effective tool in the process of reproductive 
“othering” – categorizing groups into “reproductively modern” and “reproductively 
primitive”. Since Zionism adopts the Orientalist narrative and was partly a 
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transformation project aimed at “modernization” through “Westernization”; the 
synergy of Zionism, Orientalism and Malthusianism serves to classify only the 
reproductively modern – those of small, planned, Westernized families – as capable of 
producing citizens of quality for the Jewish state. Thus in the case of Israel (as in 
many other contexts) this reproductive othering serves to distinguish between those 
who should be encouraged to reproduce and those who should not.  
6.2 Stolen  Generations 
Possibly the most shocking example of this rationale is the thousands of babies stolen 
from Arab Jewish women that were given, and very often sold, to Ashkenazi families 
(Giladi 1990:90; Massad 1996:56). This was a practice that began in the 1920s and 
carried on right up until the 1970s when the last cases were reported.
45 It is most 
commonly known to have happened to Yemenite children but there is evidence that 
shows many Jewish children from other Arab countries suffered the same fate.
46 The 
taking of Arab Jewish children was an attempt to “Europeanize” a generation by 
bringing them up in European families, protecting against the growing numbers of 
non-Europeans in the Jewish population and their effect on the “modern” Western 
culture of Israel. This is an episode in the history of the Mizrahim, which still 
resonates painfully with many Mizrahi families and has been the subject of a number 
of official enquiries and television documentaries (Massad 1996:56). Indeed it 
happened on such a vast scale and with the complicity of large numbers of doctors, 
nurses and social workers that it is hard to believe that there was no official policy 
encouraging this practice.
47 Yet the Israeli state has never apologised nor stated that 
there was any official policy for removing Arab Jewish children. Instead the 
“bureaucratic chaos” of the early state period has been blamed, together with the 
portrayal of the Yemenites as “irresponsible parents” (Massad 1995:57). This episode 
reflects the Zionist view of the Arab Jewish family, casting the Mizrahim, as a whole, 
as “irresponsible breeders” and their large families as evidence of their “uncivilised 
and backward” cultures. This not only provided the justification for the removal of 
children from their parents but also gave further credence to the perception of the 
Arab Jews as an “internal demographic threat”.  
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6.3 “Malthusian  Couples”
 48 & the Demographic War 
When discussing Israeli population policies many feminist and other anti-Zionist 
analyses have fallen into the trap of understanding these policies as either aimed at 
“Arabs” or “Jews”, and understandably so, given the Israeli preoccupation with the 
demographic number battle of Jews versus Palestinians. This “war of the cradles”, as 
it is referred to, flows directly from the Zionist project to settle the historic land of 
Palestine with Jews and thus demographic obsession has become a central feature of 
the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Where immigration once played so vital a role, its 
decline in recent years and the tendency toward out migration has meant that the 
demographic future of the region will largely be determined by decisions about 
reproduction (Courbage 1999:25). But what is missing from feminist and other anti-
Zionist analyses of the demographic issue generally, and fertility policies in particular, 
is the story as it relates to the Mizrahim. As what these analyses have failed to explore 
is the relationship between poverty, ethnicity and class in the Jewish population and 
how this interacts with and shapes the demographic political economy (Melamed 
2005:16). Thus the focus on the conflict’s nationalist dynamic has meant that the 
conflicts, inequalities and tensions within Israel’s Jewish population are lost. This 
prioritises the Ashkenazi Zionist narrative and to a certain extent, reproduces it, by 
reinforcing the dichotomy between “Arab” and “Jew” (ibid.). It is therefore crucial to 
recognise that pro and antinatalist policies cannot simply be defined as directed at the 
Jewish or the Arab population, it is much more complex than that. As while Israeli 
nationalist rhetoric exhorted Jewish women “to produce for the nation” and 
emphasised the necessity for Jews to win “the war of the cradles”, those in the 
establishment, in government committees, in health and social services were 
producing and implementing policies that would encourage Mizrahi Jews to have 
fewer children. The higher Mizrahi fertility rate has been instrumental to the 
demographic Jewish majority in Israel, but like the split between the “desired Jewish 
part” of their identity with the “repugnant Arab part”, this has also been treated as 
both welcomed and unwanted: 
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… large families are perceived as undermining the “modern” character of the state 
– the very “quality” – of the Jewish “nation”. Yet, large families are also elevated 
as important donors to Jewish demographic “quantity” and strength… (Melamed 
2005:18) 
This is the crux of the seemingly contradictory nature of Israeli fertility policy. 
For how were policies aimed at reducing the Mizrahi family size justified in a context 
where a Jewish majority was deemed necessary to maintain the Jewish state? 
Couples with large families are often perceived as ignorant – lacking 
knowledge about proper birth control methods and the rationale to limit the number of 
children they have because of their attachment to “backward traditions” – and thus 
procreating “thoughtlessly” and “uncontrollably” (Kanaaneh 2002:104).
49 This is the 
mutual language of modernisation and Malthusian theory as it applies to the Third 
world, the global “reproductive others”, whose high fertility rates – evidence of their 
“ignorance” and “irrationality” – are pinpointed as the cause for their poverty and 
discontent (Hartmann 1987:6). These Malthusian stigmas have thus enabled Israeli 
policymakers to create distinctions between so-called “planning” and “non-planning” 
couples, utilising this to design fertility policies meant to encourage “modern, 
educated couples” to increase their family size while encouraging “the reproductively 
primitive” to limit theirs (Melamed 2005:24). As while the demographic battle 
between the Palestinians is fundamentally important to the Zionist project, the 
Ashkenazi establishment did not consider the Mizrahim to have the suitable 
characteristics to be at the forefront of this particular battle: For the Zionist project, 
building the “new Jew” and the new nation meant that while the quantity of children 
was fundamentally important, this was coupled with a considerable emphasis on the 
“quality” of the children produced (Stoler-Liss 2003:115). This statement by Joseph 
Meir clearly illustrates his disregard for the Mizrahi contribution to the Jewish 
population in Israel: “We have no interest in the tenth or even the seventh child of the 
poor Mizrahi families….We must pray for the second child of the families of the 
intelligentsia”.
50 It was understood that in order to produce “children of quality” the 
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mother had to be “highly civilised and cultured” – clearly in the “reproductively 
modern” category, and therefore the “lower educational status” of Mizrahi women 
and their propensity for large families were seen as evidence of their “cultural 
unfitness” for proper motherhood (Melamed 2005:26). Even today Mizrahi women 
are portrayed as improper mothers, the junkie or the prostitute mother who neglects 
her children depicted in training manuals for health and social workers are all Mizrahi 
women.
51  
By relying on the language of modernisation and extolling the “scientific” 
logic of Malthusianism, members of the Zionist establishment and its policymakers 
were able to mask the controversial nature of their population policies in relation to 
the Mizrahim (Ibid:14). Which were prompted in large part, to delay the time the 
Mizrahim would form the majority of the Jewish population in Israel: ‘The situation 
around the country is worsening in relation to the immigration from Oriental 
countries. The future teller has calculated and found out that within decades from 
now we will all become Orientals…’
52 As such the desired reduction in the Mizrahi 
family size was presented as a crucial part of the “modernisation process” of the 
Mizrahim, necessary for their own advancement. 
6.4  Lies, Damn Lies & Statistics 
A report into the events of the Wadi Salib uprising in 1959 highlighted the large size 
of families as a “difficult factor” in the integration of immigrants particularly in areas 
relating to housing and income.
53 Thus excusing the skewed distribution of resources 
in favour of the Ashkenazim and blaming the higher fertility of Arab Jews as a reason 
for their discontent. Such a strategy reflects the typical usage of Malthusian theory, 
which Hartmann (1987:28) explains serves to legitimize the status quo by reasoning 
that if the poor are rising up it is because their numbers are too many. Thus as a 
response to the events of Wadi Salib and the report, the government set up the 
Natality Committee in 1962, which was established to ‘consider the means by which 
large and deprived families could be assisted and to advise the government on matters 
concerning natality policies’ (Portugese 1998:76). Professor Roberto Bachi, who had 
been appointed government statistician in 1948 and who founded the Central Bureau 
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of Statistics in that same year, headed the committee which was concerned both with 
the gap between the Jewish/Arab (Palestinian) birth rate and the gap between the 
European Jewish and Arab Jewish birth rate (Melamed 2005:41). Despite the fact that 
demographic data showed at the time that Mizrahi fertility had begun declining 
considerably and that Ashkenazi fertility was on the increase, Professor Roberto 
Bachi distorted the data to show the contrary, in order to heighten fears over the 
“looming demographic threat” posed to the Ashkenazi population (Hashash 2004:49-
57). Thus while the evidenced showed that Mizrahi women were beginning to have 
fewer children, the committee produced a report in 1966, stressing the concern with 
the lower national Jewish birth rate as a whole compared to the higher Palestinian 
birth rate, but making clearly selective pronatalist policy recommendations based on 
an ethnic division between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews – though this was expressed 
in the report using the terminology of “small families” and “large families” (Melamed 
2005:40). There are two main reasons why the pronatalist policy recommendations 
proposed were not explicitly linked to the European Jewish population: firstly the 
protests launched by Mizrahim who were organising politically and accusing the state 
of discrimination necessitated that “Jewish national unity” be emphasised and any 
ethnic differentiation obscured. Secondly the identification of Ashkenazim as 
“reproductively modern” and Mirzrahim as “reproductively primitive” was already 
institutionalised in policy approaches of the state and so the categories of “small” and 
“large” families were already well established and understood (Ibid:44). For “large 
families” therefore, the report recommended access to family planning information, 
education for women and men to improve the “quality” of their parenthood, and the 
provision of direct services to children from large families, in order to ensure that 
parents would not “misuse” family grants (ibid.). For “small families” economic 
incentives were recommended such as assistance with obtaining a bigger house and 
reducing the cost of children’s education (ibid.). These policies thus served to ingrain 
more deeply the social and economic inequalities between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi 
Jews. By offering parenting classes and family planning information to large, 
primarily Mirzrahi, families the state was “affirming” their place as irresponsible and 
incompetent parents, incapable of controlling their fertility and raising their children. 
Thus having fewer children and becoming better parents were presented as solutions 
to the economic and social problems of the Mizrahim. The fact that family planning   46
clinics have been concentrated in peripheral zones, which are inhabited largely by 
Mizrahim, is evidence of these policy recommendations (Portugese 1998:125).  
In contrast, the assistance with housing and education for smaller, primarily 
Ashkenazi, families was justified on the basis that responsible parents had fewer 
children in order to invest more in each child and so to encourage these families to 
have a greater number of children, material and social goods like more spacious 
housing and education, would have to be made more easily accessible for these 
families (Melamed 2005:44). It is highly significant that most of Israel’s pronatalist 
policies aimed at providing incentives to middle and upper-middle income, small 
(European) families to encourage them to have more children has had little overall 
effect (see chapter four). This is even acknowledged by the committees themselves 
where it was stated that grants and incentives to smaller families did not ensure an 
increase in births (Melamed 2005:43). Considering this and the fact that the 
population data actually showed that Mirzrahi fertility was beginning to decline, the 
question arises, what purpose were these policies designed to serve? It is argued that 
these policies were not only intended to limit the Mizrahi demographic majority, but 
were also designed to assist and sustain the racialised class formation of Israeli 
society.
54 
6.5  Fertility Policy & Class Structure 
Pronatalist (and antinatalist) policies are not generally formulated for ideological sake 
but rather as tools to further economic and political agendas. While the Israeli 
pronatalist policies directed at the Ashkenazim were certainly sincere in this desired 
goal, these policies primarily acted as mechanisms to assist the creation of an affluent 
middle class that was predominantly white European.
55 In order to see this more 
clearly it is necessary to review a range of these policies:  
In the 1960s a series of state sponsored balcony closures were carried out in 
Tel Aviv, where balconies were converted into an extra room for the family so as to 
provide more space for another child. However this policy was carried out only in the 
homes of Ashkenazim, identified often by the location or by the resident’s family 
name.
56 Given that Mizrahi families of six or seven members had homes of similar, or 
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in some cases of smaller size, to the homes of Ashkenazi families of three or four 
members (Allouche 2003:46; Giladi 1990:231) clearly illustrates the skewed 
distributional priorities of government social policy. Providing smaller families with 
extensions to their homes whilst disregarding the cramped conditions of larger 
families is about more than pronatalist concerns (especially since there was little 
guarantee that such a policy would actually result in an increased number of births) it 
is designed to create social and material differences between ethnic groups. The 
justification for providing more spacious housing to Ashkenazi families was based on 
the notion that only more readily accessible social and material goods, such as 
cheaper schooling and spacious housing, would encourage an increase in the low 
Ashkenazi birthrate due to their status as responsible Malthusian couples. Even in the 
1980s demographers Goldscheider and Friedlander (1986:34) stated that  
… the higher ideal than actual family size among low fertility European Jewish 
population groups will persist unless the socioeconomic constraints on fertility are 
lessened. Pronatalist policies that are designed to increase fertility, particularly 
among European Jewish subgroups, must take into account these constraints. 
Thus according to Goldscheider and Friedlander the answer to the low 
Ashkenazi birthrate was to remove the socioeconomic constraints facing this section 
of the population. While no similar recommendation was made for the Mizrahim, 
despite the fact that the Mizrahim face enormous socioeconomic constraints given 
their situation on the geographical, economic and social periphery. This approach to 
fertility policy has therefore assisted the ethnic division of Israeli society into a class 
of low paid blue and white-collar, largely Mizrahi (and Palestinian) workers and an 
educated, highly skilled, managerial middle class that is overwhelmingly Ashkenazi. 
These divisive policies were presented however, as impartial means to encourage 
smaller families to have more children and thus as part of the all encompassing 
nationalist concern for the demographic welfare, indeed the very survival, of the 
Israeli state.  
Another interesting example of the connection between fertility policy and 
class structuring is the Large Families Insurance Scheme (LFIS) 1959. After the Wadi 
Salib riots in 1959 the state was anxious to quell the social discontent and take the 
focus off the unequal distribution of resources. As a response to the riots the LFIS was 
rapidly introduced, after the report into the riots (mentioned previously) highlighted 
the large size of Mizrahi families to be a difficult factor in their absorption into Israeli   48
society (Melamed 2005:29). This scheme formed the basis of future child allowance 
policies and has undergone many changes since its inception (ibid.). In its 1959 form 
it provided grants to families with four or more children under fourteen years old, this 
was later increased to eighteen in 1965 (Portugese 1998:95). It was presented as a 
policy supporting Jewish pronatalism and social welfare, which was particularly 
targeted at poor, large Mizrahi families. The context of social unrest and resentment 
prompted the enactment of the LFIS, and was crucial to the way it was depicted as 
Melamed (2005:36) explains:  
In a social reality in which large family became not only a code name for the 
poverty and inferiority of Arab Jews, but also perceived as their very generating 
mechanism, the legislation of the LFIS was supposed to carry a multiple message – 
of inclusion on the one hand, and of a concrete solution for poverty on the other – 
to the protesting Arab Jews. 
This message of inclusion was seen as essential for maintaining national unity 
in the face of growing discontent and thus the LFIS was portrayed as a policy aimed 
at promoting the socioeconomic welfare of large families in a bid to demonstrate that 
the Mizrahi Jews were a valued part of the Israeli nation. But as Portugese (1998:95) 
points out ‘had welfare been the main concern of the government, it would have tied 
child allowances to the poverty level of a family rather than to its size.’ The LFIS 
clearly implicated the reproductive habits of the Mizrahim as a central factor for their 
poor living conditions that they were protesting against, and thus deflected attention 
away from the role of the state and its institutions in creating and sustaining structural 
inequalities (Melamed 2005:37). Indeed many of the Knesset members themselves 
doubted if the act would achieve significant improvements in the harsh socioeconomic 
conditions of the Mizrahim because the allowances were too low and only began with 
the fourth child (Ibid:32). Portugese (1998:95) sees this as a policy that was therefore 
really aimed at encouraging the Jewish fertility rate but Melamed (2005:32) contends 
this, arguing that ‘paradoxically, the fact that family allowances were tied to large 
family size undermines, rather than reinforces, the argument of Jewish pronatalism.’ 
By connecting family welfare provisions to the size of the family, this strengthened 
the perceived link between large family size and poverty; and thus large family size 
became the explanation for why the Mizrahim were locked into the cycle of poverty, 
inferiority and underdevelopment (Ibid:39-40).  
What is most illustrative is the fact that the scheme provided allowances to all 
families with four or more children including Palestinian citizens of Israel. Indeed the   49
“Israeli Arabs” (Palestinians) and the Mizrahim were discussed together as the main 
groups that would enjoy the allowances due to their similar reproductive habits 
(Ibid:36). If Jewish pronatalism had been the main goal of the act the inclusion of the 
Palestinians under the scheme would have undermined this objective. As it was, the 
language of welfare and socioeconomic hardship served to highlight the “culturally 
primitive” reproductive behaviour of both the Mizrahim and the Palestinians 
(Ibid:35). In addition the fact that the LFIS remained the main attempt to address 
poverty did nothing to alleviate the actual conditions of poverty as one Knesset 
member was well aware:  
… [the allowances are] like one drop in the big sea of needs. The government is 
responsible to this grave socioeconomic state of the Mizrahim … [we] cannot 
ignore [the fact] that the fundamental problems such as unemployment, low wages, 
terrible crowded housing conditions, remain in their validity and cruelty.
57 
Without addressing the root causes of poverty and inequality, the LFIS, and 
subsequent welfare policies of the Israeli state, ensured that the Mizrahim (and the 
Palestinians) would be cast as “dependent on welfare” and as a “burden on the state”. 
The fact that over forty years later, even after the dramatic Mizrahi fertility decline, 
the Mizrahim are stigmatised as the major recipients of welfare is, in part, a testament 
to this failure (Melamed 2005:40). 
The LFIS should be seen in direct contrast to the system of tax credits for 
families with dependent children introduced in 1968 (Hashash 2004:84). This scheme 
was in fact specifically designed for small, wealthier families who did not qualify for 
the LFIS because they had less than four children (Portugese 1998:96). The qualifying 
tax threshold set for the tax credit scheme was too high for the poor, which meant that 
only middle and upper middle income families benefited (ibid.). Thus the more 
affluent, mostly Ashkenazi families had their position in the Israeli middle and upper-
middle classes reinforced by the provision of extra disposable income that was 
provided with no negative stigmas attached, unlike welfare payments. This system of 
providing family allowances through different mechanisms, one for the more affluent 
members of society and another for those on low incomes, was designed to maintain 
the socioeconomic status quo whilst pacifying calls for social justice and 
redistribution.  It   also   served   to  encourage  increased  reproduction   for  wealthier 
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families and discourage it for poor families. What is significant is that the range of 
policies discussed here, were presented as schemes to aid families in need, 
emphasising “Jewish national unity” at a time when a large proportion of the Jewish 
population was feeling resentful. But instead what these policies achieved was to 
entrench the inequalities even further, strengthening the racialised class structures in 
Israeli society.  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
7.1  Arab and Jewish? 
Shohat (1998:16) states that the Zionist project of “ingathering the exiles” largely 
transformed itself into a “modernisation mission” where the immigrants from Asia 
and Africa were concerned. The Jews from Europe were perceived as simply having 
to be “absorbed” into Israeli society, whereas those from Asia and Africa could only 
be “absorbed” through the process of “modernisation” – a euphemism for the erasure 
of their largely Arabic identity and their assimilation into Euro-Israeli life (ibid.). In a 
Knesset meeting about the Yemeni immigrants in 1951, Ben Gurion stated that ‘the 
aim of the government is to inculcate the Yemeni immigrant with Israeli values to the 
point that he forgets where he came from…’ 
58 As such the efforts to “de-Arabise” the 
Arab Jewish immigrants have been relentless, indeed everything associated with “the 
Arab” has been despised and ridiculed in Zionist literature, public media and in school 
books, to the point that this contempt for the Arab identity has been internalised by 
many Mizrahim (Giladi 1990:188). Shohat (1999:15) states that under Zionism, Arab 
Jews have lived a visceral schizophrenia, mingling stubborn self-pride with an 
imposed self-rejection: 
Mizrahim in Israel were made to feel ashamed of their dark, olive skin, of their 
guttural language, of the winding quarter tones of their music, even of their 
traditions of hospitality. Children, trying desperately to conform to an elusive 
Euro-Israeli Sabra norm, were made to feel ashamed of their parents and their 
Arab countries of origin. At times Mizrahim were mistaken for Palestinians and 
arrested or beaten. Since Arabness led only to rejection, many Mizrahim became 
self-hating. In a classic play of colonial specularity, the East came to view itself 
through the West’s distorting mirror. 
Thus the suppression of the Arab Jewish identity has meant the rejection of 
Arabic language, music and customs, and indeed  Chetrit  (2000a:60)  argues that  this 
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identity had been suppressed so deeply that it makes any discussion of its existence 
extremely painful. This is illustrated by the fact that few Mizrahim will refer to 
themselves as “Mizrahim”, or as “Arab Jews”, preferring “Israeli” as this avoids any 
inferences of inferiority and provides access to a powerful nationalist discourse, and 
all that it promises. The Arab Jewish identity, on the other hand, represents a past 
which has been systematically denigrated and indeed the Arab Jews have been 
trapped in a no-exit situation, unable to return, unlike the Jews from Europe or North 
America – ‘Arab Jews have been forbidden from nourishing memories of having 
belonged to the peoples across the river Jordan, across the mountains of Lebanon and 
across the Sinai desert and Suez canal’ (Shohat 1999:7). In some ways, it seems the 
Mizrahim have even more invested in the Israeli nationalist discourse than the 
Ashkenazim. Thus recognizing the Arab Jewish identity means confronting 
uncomfortable truths and requires making a painful inner journey, Chetrit (ibid.) states 
that ‘it is because of the difficulty of the journey that not many undertake it.’ Indeed 
accepting oneself as both Arab and Jewish in the Israeli context is largely a privilege 
of educated intellectuals.
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It is not surprising therefore, that many Mizrahim have undertaken to 
“modernise”, indeed “Ashkenazify” themselves, as a means to affirm their place in 
Israeli society and as an attempt to move up the social scale, as  Dahan Kalev 
(2001:10) explains: ‘I finally made my choice in favour of the rich, successful and 
strong (winning) side – Ashkenazi action. The price I paid for this effort was full 
alienation from my self and my identity….’ And even this choice has not guaranteed 
upward social mobility as while the Mizrahim are “encouraged” to integrate into the 
Ashkenazi fabric of Israeli life, the basic social infrastructures of the economy and 
capital, of education and culture still mainly serve the Ashkenazi dominated upper 
middle classes and elites (Chetrit 2000a:62). 
The bifurcation between the Jewish and the Arabic identity has been 
fundamental to the Zionist project, not simply for the furtherance of Zionist ideology, 
but also for the preservation of the racialised class structures and the Ashkenazi 
hegemony within Israeli society. Indeed the policies of underdevelopment and 
impoverishment cannot be separated from the policies of erasure and cultural 
suppression (Giladi 1990:187). Just as these policies cannot be divorced from the 
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wider conflict with the Palestinians, as while the Mizrahim erased the Arab image in 
themselves, the Arab was marked out as their new enemy both on the battlefield and 
in the quest to create a new Israeli Jew (Chetrit 2000a:62): 
The Ashkenazi does not have to stress his Jewishness, since it is obvious to him 
that he/she is not an Arab. He has no such problem. The Ashkenazi has a clear 
stand regarding his relations with Arabs – you are there and we are here – and 
there is nothing there to mix. But the Mizrahi is similar to the Arab in outward 
appearance, customs, dialect and in other things that force him to distinguish 
himself from the Arab, in order to achieve equality on the basis of a national 
identity. If the criterion for equality is nationalism, so they must prove their 
nationalism.
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Proving this nationalism has meant, amongst other things, the rejection of all 
things “Arab” and the emulation of the characteristics of the “Sabra”, the “new 
Israeli”, as dictated by the hegemonic Euro-Israeli discourse. Thus forbidding any 
expression of sympathy or solidarity with the “other oppressed Arabs” – the 
Palestinians: 
Israel imposed the “Oriental” identity on those immigrants in order to set them 
apart from those citizens perceived as entitled to the “Israeli” identity, the 
Ashkenazi Jews; and also, to a certain degree, to set them apart from the 
Palestinian Arab citizens, who were entitled to almost nothing. (Shiran 1991:304)  
So while the Oriental identity has meant discrimination, the Arab identity has 
meant even greater discrimination (ibid.) and therefore the necessity to distance 
oneself from both these images has been compelling, and given the no-exit situation 
which Mizrahim have found themselves, it is not surprising that many Mizrahim 
followed the example of their Ashkenazi oppressors and imposed their stigmas on the 
definitive “others” in Israeli society, the Palestinians.  
7.2 Conclusions 
The discussions in chapters five and six demonstrate how the Zionist modernisation 
project has generated the underdevelopment of Mizrahim on the premise of 
developmentalist orientated goals toward “modernisation”. Indeed the modernisation 
discourse has been used to engineer the socioeconomic class structures in Israeli 
society along ethnic lines and also to deny the establishment’s role in these deliberate 
constructions. Chapter six illustrates how the reproductive habits of Mizrahim were 
instead    implicated   for   their   socioeconomic   underdevelopment   and    how    the 
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reproductive differences between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim were utilised to 
reinforce the class formations in Israeli society. Within both these chapters the 
connections between underdevelopment, class positioning, reproductive status and 
identity are clearly set out. It thus highlights the importance reproductive discourses 
and practices have on constructions of identity, which is heightened in the context of 
the Mizrahim, and thus high fertility has become an ethnic and class mark. Indeed it is 
interesting to note that middle class families with a greater number of children than 
the lower fertility averages are not posited as “reproductively primitive”, and thus 
reproductive “othering” is, in essence, an exercise of power, which reflects the 
dominant hierarchical structures in society, underlining their presence in the lives of 
those on the periphery (Kanaaneh 2002:165). 
What is striking about the stigmatisation of Mizrahi reproductive habits and 
the reproductive “othering” of the Palestinians is the similarity in the language: both 
are described as backward, primitive, irrational and both Mizrahi and Palestinian 
women have been constructed as improper, even pathological mothers, primarily due 
to their higher fertility (Melamed 2005:26; Stoler-Liss 2003:108). The fact that the 
LFIS was targeted at Mizrahi as well as Palestinian families illustrated the prevalence 
of Malthusian thinking regarding both Mizrahim and Palestinians, and thus this high 
profile connection between poverty and higher fertility also implied the link between 
these characteristics and “Arabness”. In fact the higher fertility of Mizrahi Jews was 
seen as a demonstrative feature of their “Arabness” by the Zionist establishment 
(Melamed 2005:18) and therefore of their inferiority.  
The discussions in this paper illustrate the profound crisis the rupture of the 
Arab Jewish identity has produced for Mizrahim, and given the dominant 
socioeconomic and political structures, their manoeuvrability outside of these 
conceptions of modernity and these reproductive discourses has been highly 
restricted, and has meant that identification and cooperation with the dominant 
Ashkenazi groups have been the primary means for social mobility and acceptance 
(Chetrit 2000a:62). The trend toward lower fertility is just one aspect of the wide-
ranging reform of their Mizrahi identity into the more desirable, acceptable identity of 
the “modern Israeli”. While this paper lacks evidence from individual testimony for 
the role the dominant reproductive discourses have played in the reduction of fertility; 
the discussions in academic literature, in the Knesset and in public media, in addition 
to the analysis this paper provides, clearly illustrates the prevalence of the   54
modernisation narrative in constructing nearly every possible social and personal 
characteristic, including reproductive habits, as “modern” or “backward”, or indeed as 
evidence of “Jewishness” or “Arabness” . In addition the fact that antinatalist policies 
were aimed at poor Mizrahi families and were justified using both the language of 
modernisation and eugenics, raises significant doubts as to the “uncontroversial” 
classification given to the Mizrahi fertility decline (see Okun 1997:317). Thus this 
paper demonstrates that the explanations in Israeli sociological literature for the 
Mizrahi fertility decline are lacking as they do not reflect the full reality of the 
processes behind the fertility decline nor do they appreciate the complexity of the 
ambivalent status of Mizrahim in Israeli society and the strategies employed by 
Mizrahi Jews to placate this. 
The purpose of this research was not to extrapolate a definitive list of reasons 
for the fertility decline of Mizrahi Jews in Israel but to explore the power of narrative 
and reproductive “othering” in a context where identity is central to political, social 
and economic entitlements. In fact, it is important to note that the discourse of 
reproductive “othering” reveals more about the assumptions and attitudes of the 
speaker than about the practices of the “others” it is imposed on (Kanaaneh 
2002:166). In essence, this paper has endeavoured to show how issues of 
reproduction, identity and class intersect and interact with each other, and how the 
language of modernisation and its reliance on Malthusian rationale are used to further 
class interests, and how these discourses define and shape the structures through 
which social mobility and empowerment are perceived as possible. It therefore also 
tells us something about the efforts of people to undo their marginalisation (ibid.), 
specifically, the seemingly paradoxical fact that dominant narratives are often used by 
the very people they oppress to formulate strategies for their emancipation and thus 
the limitations on the ability of these strategies to deliver becomes apparent.   55
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1: Comparison of Municipalities by Various Socioeconomic Data 
Development Towns  Average Income 
per capita (NIS) 
% Sub Minimum 
Wage Earners 
% Twice Average 
Wage Earners 
% Work Seekers
15 & over 
% Students 
20-29 
% Families + 
4 Children 
Kiryat Gat  2,481  44.87  3.02  5.74  10.34  13.61 
Dimona 2,761  43.17  6.82  7.12  8.5  15.51 
Yeroham 2,455  45.04  4.81  6.07  8.67  20.98 
Netivot 1,854  51.25  1.87  4  6.22  29.81 
Kiryat Shemona  2,937  42.91  3.5  3.56  10.83  10.18 
Average 2497.6  45.448  4.004  5.298  8.912  18.018 
       
Ashkenazi  Towns       
Giv'atayim 4,714  30.21  16.81  1.89  25.83  2.07 
Lehavim 6,595  23.14  31.13  1.49  52.96  5.93 
Savyon 6,497  25.16  33.57  0.79  34.25  5.35 
Omer 7,627  26.05  34.01  1.49  56.12  10.48 
Kiryat  Ono  4,784  30.83 16.5 2.21 26.2 4.21 
Average 6043.4  27.078  26.404  1.574  39.072  5.608 
       
Palestinian  Towns       
Umm Al-Fahm  1,255  60.83  1.39  5.62  3.91  36.34 
‘Arrabe 1,354  57.6  1.73  5.51  8  37.08 
Mughar  1,518  52.34 3.68 5.64 7.23 37.2 
Sakhnin 1,427  55.47  1.33  7.44  6.38  32.79 
Kafar Kanna  1,362  56.64  1.75  6.88  6.04  40.38 
Average 1383.2  56.576  1.976  6.218  6.312  36.758 
(Source: Local Councils & Municipalities Socioeconomic Index 2001, Table 1)  59
 